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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.21846 |
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| _version_ | 1866916945586028544 |
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| author | Schwartz, Hadleigh Yan, Xiaofeng Carver, Charles J. Zhou, Xia |
| author_facet | Schwartz, Hadleigh Yan, Xiaofeng Carver, Charles J. Zhou, Xia |
| contents | High-profile speech videos are prime targets for falsification, owing to their accessibility and influence. This work proposes VeriLight, a low-overhead and unobtrusive system for protecting speech videos from visual manipulations of speaker identity and lip and facial motion. Unlike the predominant purely digital falsification detection methods, VeriLight creates dynamic physical signatures at the event site and embeds them into all video recordings via imperceptible modulated light. These physical signatures encode semantically-meaningful features unique to the speech event, including the speaker's identity and facial motion, and are cryptographically-secured to prevent spoofing. The signatures can be extracted from any video downstream and validated against the portrayed speech content to check its integrity. Key elements of VeriLight include (1) a framework for generating extremely compact (i.e., 150-bit), pose-invariant speech video features, based on locality-sensitive hashing; and (2) an optical modulation scheme that embeds $>$200 bps into video while remaining imperceptible both in video and live. Experiments on extensive video datasets show VeriLight achieves AUCs $\geq$ 0.99 and a true positive rate of 100% in detecting falsified videos. Further, VeriLight is highly robust across recording conditions, video post-processing techniques, and white-box adversarial attacks on its feature extraction methods. A demonstration of VeriLight is available at https://mobilex.cs.columbia.edu/verilight. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2504_21846 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Combating Falsification of Speech Videos with Live Optical Signatures (Extended Version) Schwartz, Hadleigh Yan, Xiaofeng Carver, Charles J. Zhou, Xia Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Artificial Intelligence Cryptography and Security High-profile speech videos are prime targets for falsification, owing to their accessibility and influence. This work proposes VeriLight, a low-overhead and unobtrusive system for protecting speech videos from visual manipulations of speaker identity and lip and facial motion. Unlike the predominant purely digital falsification detection methods, VeriLight creates dynamic physical signatures at the event site and embeds them into all video recordings via imperceptible modulated light. These physical signatures encode semantically-meaningful features unique to the speech event, including the speaker's identity and facial motion, and are cryptographically-secured to prevent spoofing. The signatures can be extracted from any video downstream and validated against the portrayed speech content to check its integrity. Key elements of VeriLight include (1) a framework for generating extremely compact (i.e., 150-bit), pose-invariant speech video features, based on locality-sensitive hashing; and (2) an optical modulation scheme that embeds $>$200 bps into video while remaining imperceptible both in video and live. Experiments on extensive video datasets show VeriLight achieves AUCs $\geq$ 0.99 and a true positive rate of 100% in detecting falsified videos. Further, VeriLight is highly robust across recording conditions, video post-processing techniques, and white-box adversarial attacks on its feature extraction methods. A demonstration of VeriLight is available at https://mobilex.cs.columbia.edu/verilight. |
| title | Combating Falsification of Speech Videos with Live Optical Signatures (Extended Version) |
| topic | Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Artificial Intelligence Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.21846 |