HoneyWin: High-Interaction Windows Honeypot in Enterprise Environment

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Aung, Yan Lin, Khoo, Yee Loon, Zheng, Davis Yang, Duo, Bryan Swee, Chattopadhyay, Sudipta, Zhou, Jianying, Lu, Liming, Goh, Weihan
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
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author Aung, Yan Lin
Khoo, Yee Loon
Zheng, Davis Yang
Duo, Bryan Swee
Chattopadhyay, Sudipta
Zhou, Jianying
Lu, Liming
Goh, Weihan
author_facet Aung, Yan Lin
Khoo, Yee Loon
Zheng, Davis Yang
Duo, Bryan Swee
Chattopadhyay, Sudipta
Zhou, Jianying
Lu, Liming
Goh, Weihan
contents Windows operating systems (OS) are ubiquitous in enterprise Information Technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) environments. Due to their widespread adoption and known vulnerabilities, they are often the primary targets of malware and ransomware attacks. With 93% of the ransomware targeting Windows-based systems, there is an urgent need for advanced defensive mechanisms to detect, analyze, and mitigate threats effectively. In this paper, we propose HoneyWin a high-interaction Windows honeypot that mimics an enterprise IT environment. The HoneyWin consists of three Windows 11 endpoints and an enterprise-grade gateway provisioned with comprehensive network traffic capturing, host-based logging, deceptive tokens, endpoint security and real-time alerts capabilities. The HoneyWin has been deployed live in the wild for 34 days and receives more than 5.79 million unsolicited connections, 1.24 million login attempts, 5 and 354 successful logins via remote desktop protocol (RDP) and secure shell (SSH) respectively. The adversary interacted with the deceptive token in one of the RDP sessions and exploited the public-facing endpoint to initiate the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) brute-force bot attack via SSH sessions. The adversary successfully harvested 1,250 SMTP credentials after attempting 151,179 credentials during the attack.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_00465
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle HoneyWin: High-Interaction Windows Honeypot in Enterprise Environment
Aung, Yan Lin
Khoo, Yee Loon
Zheng, Davis Yang
Duo, Bryan Swee
Chattopadhyay, Sudipta
Zhou, Jianying
Lu, Liming
Goh, Weihan
Cryptography and Security
Windows operating systems (OS) are ubiquitous in enterprise Information Technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) environments. Due to their widespread adoption and known vulnerabilities, they are often the primary targets of malware and ransomware attacks. With 93% of the ransomware targeting Windows-based systems, there is an urgent need for advanced defensive mechanisms to detect, analyze, and mitigate threats effectively. In this paper, we propose HoneyWin a high-interaction Windows honeypot that mimics an enterprise IT environment. The HoneyWin consists of three Windows 11 endpoints and an enterprise-grade gateway provisioned with comprehensive network traffic capturing, host-based logging, deceptive tokens, endpoint security and real-time alerts capabilities. The HoneyWin has been deployed live in the wild for 34 days and receives more than 5.79 million unsolicited connections, 1.24 million login attempts, 5 and 354 successful logins via remote desktop protocol (RDP) and secure shell (SSH) respectively. The adversary interacted with the deceptive token in one of the RDP sessions and exploited the public-facing endpoint to initiate the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) brute-force bot attack via SSH sessions. The adversary successfully harvested 1,250 SMTP credentials after attempting 151,179 credentials during the attack.
title HoneyWin: High-Interaction Windows Honeypot in Enterprise Environment
topic Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.00465