Bilateral Cognitive Security Games in Networked Control Systems under Stealthy Injection Attacks

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Nguyen, Anh Tung, Zhu, Quanyan, Teixeira, André
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2025
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author Nguyen, Anh Tung
Zhu, Quanyan
Teixeira, André
author_facet Nguyen, Anh Tung
Zhu, Quanyan
Teixeira, André
contents This paper studies a strategic security problem in networked control systems under stealthy false data injection attacks. The security problem is modeled as a bilateral cognitive security game between a defender and an adversary, each possessing cognitive reasoning abilities. The adversary with an adversarial cognitive ability strategically attacks some interconnections of the system with the aim of disrupting the network performance while remaining stealthy to the defender. Meanwhile, the defender with a defense cognitive ability strategically monitors some nodes to impose the stealthiness constraint with the purpose of minimizing the worst-case disruption caused by the adversary. Within the proposed bilateral cognitive security framework, the preferred cognitive levels of the two strategic agents are formulated in terms of two newly proposed concepts, cognitive mismatch and cognitive resonance. Moreover, we propose a method to compute the policies for the defender and the adversary with arbitrary cognitive abilities. A sufficient condition is established under which an increase in cognitive levels does not alter the policies for the defender and the adversary, ensuring convergence. The obtained results are validated through numerical simulations.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_01232
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Bilateral Cognitive Security Games in Networked Control Systems under Stealthy Injection Attacks
Nguyen, Anh Tung
Zhu, Quanyan
Teixeira, André
Systems and Control
This paper studies a strategic security problem in networked control systems under stealthy false data injection attacks. The security problem is modeled as a bilateral cognitive security game between a defender and an adversary, each possessing cognitive reasoning abilities. The adversary with an adversarial cognitive ability strategically attacks some interconnections of the system with the aim of disrupting the network performance while remaining stealthy to the defender. Meanwhile, the defender with a defense cognitive ability strategically monitors some nodes to impose the stealthiness constraint with the purpose of minimizing the worst-case disruption caused by the adversary. Within the proposed bilateral cognitive security framework, the preferred cognitive levels of the two strategic agents are formulated in terms of two newly proposed concepts, cognitive mismatch and cognitive resonance. Moreover, we propose a method to compute the policies for the defender and the adversary with arbitrary cognitive abilities. A sufficient condition is established under which an increase in cognitive levels does not alter the policies for the defender and the adversary, ensuring convergence. The obtained results are validated through numerical simulations.
title Bilateral Cognitive Security Games in Networked Control Systems under Stealthy Injection Attacks
topic Systems and Control
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.01232