Security Metrics for Uncertain Interconnected Systems under Stealthy Data Injection Attacks
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arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866914176676397056 |
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| author | Nguyen, Anh Tung Anand, Sribalaji C. Teixeira, André M. H. |
| author_facet | Nguyen, Anh Tung Anand, Sribalaji C. Teixeira, André M. H. |
| contents | This paper quantifies the security of uncertain interconnected systems under stealthy data injection attacks. In particular, we consider a large-scale system composed of a certain subsystem interconnected with an uncertain subsystem, where only the input-output channels are accessible. An adversary is assumed to inject false data to maximize the performance loss of the certain subsystem while remaining undetected. By abstracting the uncertain subsystem as a class of admissible systems satisfying an $\mathcal{L}_2$ gain constraint, the worst-case performance loss is obtained as the solution to a convex semi-definite program depending only on the certain subsystem dynamics and such an $\mathcal{L}_2$ gain constraint. This solution is proved to serve as an upper bound for the actual worst-case performance loss when the model of the entire system is fully certain. The results are demonstrated through numerical simulations of the power transmission grid spanning Sweden and Northern Denmark. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_01233 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Security Metrics for Uncertain Interconnected Systems under Stealthy Data Injection Attacks Nguyen, Anh Tung Anand, Sribalaji C. Teixeira, André M. H. Systems and Control This paper quantifies the security of uncertain interconnected systems under stealthy data injection attacks. In particular, we consider a large-scale system composed of a certain subsystem interconnected with an uncertain subsystem, where only the input-output channels are accessible. An adversary is assumed to inject false data to maximize the performance loss of the certain subsystem while remaining undetected. By abstracting the uncertain subsystem as a class of admissible systems satisfying an $\mathcal{L}_2$ gain constraint, the worst-case performance loss is obtained as the solution to a convex semi-definite program depending only on the certain subsystem dynamics and such an $\mathcal{L}_2$ gain constraint. This solution is proved to serve as an upper bound for the actual worst-case performance loss when the model of the entire system is fully certain. The results are demonstrated through numerical simulations of the power transmission grid spanning Sweden and Northern Denmark. |
| title | Security Metrics for Uncertain Interconnected Systems under Stealthy Data Injection Attacks |
| topic | Systems and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.01233 |