The Proportional Veto Principle for Approval Ballots
Fuente:
arXiv
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2025
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| _version_ | 1866915270644203520 |
|---|---|
| author | Halpern, Daniel Procaccia, Ariel D. Suksompong, Warut |
| author_facet | Halpern, Daniel Procaccia, Ariel D. Suksompong, Warut |
| contents | The proportional veto principle, which captures the idea that a candidate vetoed by a large group of voters should not be chosen, has been studied for ranked ballots in single-winner voting. We introduce a version of this principle for approval ballots, which we call flexible-voter representation (FVR). We show that while the approval voting rule and other natural scoring rules provide the optimal FVR guarantee only for some flexibility threshold, there exists a scoring rule that is FVR-optimal for all thresholds simultaneously. We also extend our results to multi-winner voting. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_01395 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The Proportional Veto Principle for Approval Ballots Halpern, Daniel Procaccia, Ariel D. Suksompong, Warut Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics The proportional veto principle, which captures the idea that a candidate vetoed by a large group of voters should not be chosen, has been studied for ranked ballots in single-winner voting. We introduce a version of this principle for approval ballots, which we call flexible-voter representation (FVR). We show that while the approval voting rule and other natural scoring rules provide the optimal FVR guarantee only for some flexibility threshold, there exists a scoring rule that is FVR-optimal for all thresholds simultaneously. We also extend our results to multi-winner voting. |
| title | The Proportional Veto Principle for Approval Ballots |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.01395 |