Faithful and secure distributed quantum sensing under general-coherent attacks
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| author | Bizzarri, G. Barbieri, M. Manrique, M. Parisi, M. Bruni, F. Gianani, I. Rosati, M. |
| author_facet | Bizzarri, G. Barbieri, M. Manrique, M. Parisi, M. Bruni, F. Gianani, I. Rosati, M. |
| contents | Quantum metrology and cryptography can be combined in a distributed and/or remote sensing setting, where distant end-users with limited quantum capabilities can employ quantum states, transmitted by a quantum-powerful provider via a quantum network, to perform quantum-enhanced parameter estimation in a private fashion. Previous works on the subject have been limited by restricted assumptions on the capabilities of a potential eavesdropper and the use of abort-based protocols that prevent a simple practical realization. Here we introduce, theoretically analyze, and experimentally demonstrate single- and two-way protocols for distributed sensing combining several unique and desirable features: (i) a safety-threshold mechanism that allows the protocol to proceed in low-noise cases and quantifying the potential tampering with respect to the ideal estimation procedure, effectively paving the way for wide-spread practical realizations; (ii) equivalence of entanglement-based and mutually-unbiased-bases-based formulations; (iii) robustness against collective attacks via a LOCC-de-Finetti theorem, for the first time to our knowledge. Finally, we demonstrate our protocols in a photonic-based implementation, observing that the possibility of guaranteeing a safety threshold may come at a significant price in terms of the estimation bias, potentially overestimating the effect of tampering in practical settings. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_02620 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Faithful and secure distributed quantum sensing under general-coherent attacks Bizzarri, G. Barbieri, M. Manrique, M. Parisi, M. Bruni, F. Gianani, I. Rosati, M. Quantum Physics Mathematical Physics Optics Quantum metrology and cryptography can be combined in a distributed and/or remote sensing setting, where distant end-users with limited quantum capabilities can employ quantum states, transmitted by a quantum-powerful provider via a quantum network, to perform quantum-enhanced parameter estimation in a private fashion. Previous works on the subject have been limited by restricted assumptions on the capabilities of a potential eavesdropper and the use of abort-based protocols that prevent a simple practical realization. Here we introduce, theoretically analyze, and experimentally demonstrate single- and two-way protocols for distributed sensing combining several unique and desirable features: (i) a safety-threshold mechanism that allows the protocol to proceed in low-noise cases and quantifying the potential tampering with respect to the ideal estimation procedure, effectively paving the way for wide-spread practical realizations; (ii) equivalence of entanglement-based and mutually-unbiased-bases-based formulations; (iii) robustness against collective attacks via a LOCC-de-Finetti theorem, for the first time to our knowledge. Finally, we demonstrate our protocols in a photonic-based implementation, observing that the possibility of guaranteeing a safety threshold may come at a significant price in terms of the estimation bias, potentially overestimating the effect of tampering in practical settings. |
| title | Faithful and secure distributed quantum sensing under general-coherent attacks |
| topic | Quantum Physics Mathematical Physics Optics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.02620 |