Cover Image

Simultaneous All-Pay Auctions with Budget Constraints

Fuente: arXiv

Saved in:

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Liu, Yan, Qin, Ying, Wang, Zihe
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2025
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Add Tag No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!

Similar Items

Budget-Constrained Auctions with Unassured Priors: Strategic Equivalence and Structural Properties
by: Chen, Zhaohua, et al.
Published: (2022)

Optimal Calibrated Signaling in Digital Auctions
by: Du, Zhicheng, et al.
Published: (2025)

Assignment Markets with Budget Constraints
by: Batziou, Eleni, et al.
Published: (2022)

Fair Division of Chores with Budget Constraints
by: Elkind, Edith, et al.
Published: (2024)

Raising Bidders' Awareness in Second-Price Auctions
by: Li, Ying Xue, et al.
Published: (2024)

Equitable Auctions
by: Finster, Simon, et al.
Published: (2024)

Scale-robust Auctions
by: Hartline, Jason, et al.
Published: (2025)

Shill-Proof Auctions
by: Komo, Andrew, et al.
Published: (2024)

Rank-Guaranteed Auctions
by: He, Wei, et al.
Published: (2024)

Transaction Ordering Auctions
by: Schlegel, Christoph
Published: (2023)

Strategic Bidding in Knapsack Auctions
by: Khezr, Peyman, et al.
Published: (2024)

Verifying Approximate Equilibrium in Auctions
by: Pieroth, Fabian R., et al.
Published: (2024)

The Combinatorial Multi-Round Ascending Auction
by: Kasberger, Bernhard, et al.
Published: (2022)

Algorithmic Information Disclosure in Optimal Auctions
by: Cai, Yang, et al.
Published: (2024)

Cued to Queue: Information in Waiting-Line Auctions
by: Hirsch, Jack, et al.
Published: (2025)

Collusion-proof Auction Design using Side Information
by: Kudva, Sukanya, et al.
Published: (2025)

Prior-Independent Bidding Strategies for First-Price Auctions
by: Kumar, Rachitesh, et al.
Published: (2025)

To Spend or to Gain: Online Learning in Repeated Karma Auctions
by: Berriaud, Damien, et al.
Published: (2024)

Ex-Ante Truthful Distribution-Reporting Mechanisms
by: Deng, Xiaotie, et al.
Published: (2025)

Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity
by: Beyhaghi, Hedyeh, et al.
Published: (2025)

How Do Digital Advertising Auctions Impact Product Prices?
by: Bergemann, Dirk, et al.
Published: (2023)

Discrete Budget Aggregation: Truthfulness and Proportionality
by: Schmidt-Kraepelin, Ulrike, et al.
Published: (2025)

Competitive and Revenue-Optimal Pricing with Budgets
by: Finster, Simon, et al.
Published: (2023)

Using "Failure Costs" to Guarantee Execution Quality in Competitive and Permissionless Order Flow Auctions
by: Watts, Alex, et al.
Published: (2025)

Approximate Strategyproofness in Approval-based Budget Division
by: Aziz, Haris, et al.
Published: (2026)

Optimal Budget Aggregation with Star-Shaped Preference Domains
by: Brandt, Felix, et al.
Published: (2024)

Strategic Bid Shading in Real-Time Bidding Auctions in Ad Exchange Using Minority Game Theory
by: Das, Dipankar
Published: (2025)

Deep Learning for Double Auction
by: Liu, Jiayin, et al.
Published: (2025)

Approximately Fair and Population Consistent Budget Division via Simple Payment Schemes
by: Aziz, Haris, et al.
Published: (2024)

Optimal Auction Design under Costly Learning
by: Ozbek, Kemal
Published: (2025)

Buying Data of Unknown Quality: Fisher Information Procurement Auctions
by: Hu, Yuchen, et al.
Published: (2026)

Impartial Selection Under Combinatorial Constraints
by: Cembrano, Javier, et al.
Published: (2024)

A Small Collusion is All You Need
by: Gafni, Yotam
Published: (2025)

The Limits of Price Discrimination Under Privacy Constraints
by: Fallah, Alireza, et al.
Published: (2024)

Random Assignment of Indivisible Goods under Constraints
by: Kawase, Yasushi, et al.
Published: (2022)

A New Solution for Cooperative Game with Public Externalities
by: Fan, Juanjuan, et al.
Published: (2025)

Robust Auction Design with Support Information
by: Anunrojwong, Jerry, et al.
Published: (2023)

Randomized Truthful Auctions with Learning Agents
by: Aggarwal, Gagan, et al.
Published: (2024)

Learning to Coordinate Bidders in Non-Truthful Auctions
by: Fu, Hu, et al.
Published: (2025)

Artificial Intelligence for Multi-Unit Auction design
by: Khezr, Peyman, et al.
Published: (2024)