Responsibility Gap in Collective Decision Making
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866913829275828224 |
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| author | Naumov, Pavel Tao, Jia |
| author_facet | Naumov, Pavel Tao, Jia |
| contents | The responsibility gap is a set of outcomes of a collective decision-making mechanism in which no single agent is individually responsible. In general, when designing a decision-making process, it is desirable to minimise the gap.
The paper proposes a concept of an elected dictatorship. It shows that, in a perfect information setting, the gap is empty if and only if the mechanism is an elected dictatorship. It also proves that in an imperfect information setting, the class of gap-free mechanisms is positioned strictly between two variations of the class of elected dictatorships. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_06312 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Responsibility Gap in Collective Decision Making Naumov, Pavel Tao, Jia Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence The responsibility gap is a set of outcomes of a collective decision-making mechanism in which no single agent is individually responsible. In general, when designing a decision-making process, it is desirable to minimise the gap. The paper proposes a concept of an elected dictatorship. It shows that, in a perfect information setting, the gap is empty if and only if the mechanism is an elected dictatorship. It also proves that in an imperfect information setting, the class of gap-free mechanisms is positioned strictly between two variations of the class of elected dictatorships. |
| title | Responsibility Gap in Collective Decision Making |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.06312 |