Distributed Event-Triggered Nash Equilibrium Seeking for Noncooperative Games
Fuente:
arXiv
Salvato in:
| Autori principali: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
|
| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | |
| Tags: |
Aggiungi Tag
Nessun Tag, puoi essere il primo ad aggiungerne!!
|
| _version_ | 1866918017192951808 |
|---|---|
| author | Rodrigues, Victor Hugo Pereira Oliveira, Tiago Roux Krstic, Miroslav Basar, Tamer |
| author_facet | Rodrigues, Victor Hugo Pereira Oliveira, Tiago Roux Krstic, Miroslav Basar, Tamer |
| contents | We propose locally convergent Nash equilibrium seeking algorithms for $N$-player noncooperative games, which use distributed event-triggered pseudo-gradient estimates. The proposed approach employs sinusoidal perturbations to estimate the pseudo-gradients of unknown quadratic payoff functions. This is the first instance of noncooperative games being tackled in a model-free fashion with event-triggered extremum seeking. Each player evaluates independently the deviation between the corresponding current pseudo-gradient estimate and its last broadcasted value from the event-triggering mechanism to tune individually the player action, while they preserve collectively the closed-loop stability/convergence. We guarantee Zeno behavior avoidance by establishing a minimum dwell-time to avoid infinitely fast switching. In particular, the stability analysis is carried out using Lyapunov's method and averaging for systems with discontinuous right-hand sides. We quantify the size of the ultimate small residual sets around the Nash equilibrium and illustrate the theoretical results numerically on an oligopoly setting. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_06691 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Distributed Event-Triggered Nash Equilibrium Seeking for Noncooperative Games Rodrigues, Victor Hugo Pereira Oliveira, Tiago Roux Krstic, Miroslav Basar, Tamer Optimization and Control Systems and Control We propose locally convergent Nash equilibrium seeking algorithms for $N$-player noncooperative games, which use distributed event-triggered pseudo-gradient estimates. The proposed approach employs sinusoidal perturbations to estimate the pseudo-gradients of unknown quadratic payoff functions. This is the first instance of noncooperative games being tackled in a model-free fashion with event-triggered extremum seeking. Each player evaluates independently the deviation between the corresponding current pseudo-gradient estimate and its last broadcasted value from the event-triggering mechanism to tune individually the player action, while they preserve collectively the closed-loop stability/convergence. We guarantee Zeno behavior avoidance by establishing a minimum dwell-time to avoid infinitely fast switching. In particular, the stability analysis is carried out using Lyapunov's method and averaging for systems with discontinuous right-hand sides. We quantify the size of the ultimate small residual sets around the Nash equilibrium and illustrate the theoretical results numerically on an oligopoly setting. |
| title | Distributed Event-Triggered Nash Equilibrium Seeking for Noncooperative Games |
| topic | Optimization and Control Systems and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.06691 |