Price Equilibria in a Spatial Competition with Captive Buyers
Fuente:
arXiv
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2025
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| _version_ | 1866909607398473728 |
|---|---|
| author | Kawai, Shinnosuke Nakagawa, Kuninori |
| author_facet | Kawai, Shinnosuke Nakagawa, Kuninori |
| contents | This paper explores price competition with exogenous product differentiation in a spatial model similar to that of Nakagawa (2023). Nakagawa examines product differentiation within the framework of Varian (1980). Nakagawa integrates Varian's concept of uninformed consumers, who lack complete price information, into a spatial model based on Hotelling (1929). While Nakagawa placed informed consumers at the center of the Hotelling line and used quadratic transportation costs, our study employs a uniform distribution of informed consumers and linear transportation costs. This approach enables a more direct comparison with established spatial competition literature, particularly Osborne and Pitchik (1987). We classify equilibrium candidates and characterize the parameter regions corresponding to each equilibrium. There is no pure equilibrium in the region where we construct mixed strategy equilibria. Furthermore, we compare the expected profit in the equilibrium of our model with the findings of Osborne and Pitchik (1987). Finally, we discuss the impact of captive buyers on the nature of spatial competition. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_06961 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Price Equilibria in a Spatial Competition with Captive Buyers Kawai, Shinnosuke Nakagawa, Kuninori Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory 91B24 This paper explores price competition with exogenous product differentiation in a spatial model similar to that of Nakagawa (2023). Nakagawa examines product differentiation within the framework of Varian (1980). Nakagawa integrates Varian's concept of uninformed consumers, who lack complete price information, into a spatial model based on Hotelling (1929). While Nakagawa placed informed consumers at the center of the Hotelling line and used quadratic transportation costs, our study employs a uniform distribution of informed consumers and linear transportation costs. This approach enables a more direct comparison with established spatial competition literature, particularly Osborne and Pitchik (1987). We classify equilibrium candidates and characterize the parameter regions corresponding to each equilibrium. There is no pure equilibrium in the region where we construct mixed strategy equilibria. Furthermore, we compare the expected profit in the equilibrium of our model with the findings of Osborne and Pitchik (1987). Finally, we discuss the impact of captive buyers on the nature of spatial competition. |
| title | Price Equilibria in a Spatial Competition with Captive Buyers |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory 91B24 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.06961 |