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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.07149 |
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| _version_ | 1866916732301475840 |
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| author | Ren, Heqing Feng, Chao Huertas, Alberto Stiller, Burkhard |
| author_facet | Ren, Heqing Feng, Chao Huertas, Alberto Stiller, Burkhard |
| contents | Traditional machine learning (ML) raises serious privacy concerns, while federated learning (FL) mitigates the risk of data leakage by keeping data on local devices. However, the training process of FL can still leak sensitive information, which adversaries may exploit to infer private data. One of the most prominent threats is the membership inference attack (MIA), where the adversary aims to determine whether a particular data record was part of the training set.
This paper addresses this problem through a two-stage defense called AugMixCloak. The core idea is to apply data augmentation and principal component analysis (PCA)-based information fusion to query images, which are detected by perceptual hashing (pHash) as either identical to or highly similar to images in the training set. Experimental results show that AugMixCloak successfully defends against both binary classifier-based MIA and metric-based MIA across five datasets and various decentralized FL (DFL) topologies. Compared with regularization-based defenses, AugMixCloak demonstrates stronger protection. Compared with confidence score masking, AugMixCloak exhibits better generalization. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_07149 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | AugMixCloak: A Defense against Membership Inference Attacks via Image Transformation Ren, Heqing Feng, Chao Huertas, Alberto Stiller, Burkhard Machine Learning Traditional machine learning (ML) raises serious privacy concerns, while federated learning (FL) mitigates the risk of data leakage by keeping data on local devices. However, the training process of FL can still leak sensitive information, which adversaries may exploit to infer private data. One of the most prominent threats is the membership inference attack (MIA), where the adversary aims to determine whether a particular data record was part of the training set. This paper addresses this problem through a two-stage defense called AugMixCloak. The core idea is to apply data augmentation and principal component analysis (PCA)-based information fusion to query images, which are detected by perceptual hashing (pHash) as either identical to or highly similar to images in the training set. Experimental results show that AugMixCloak successfully defends against both binary classifier-based MIA and metric-based MIA across five datasets and various decentralized FL (DFL) topologies. Compared with regularization-based defenses, AugMixCloak demonstrates stronger protection. Compared with confidence score masking, AugMixCloak exhibits better generalization. |
| title | AugMixCloak: A Defense against Membership Inference Attacks via Image Transformation |
| topic | Machine Learning |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.07149 |