One Trigger Token Is Enough: A Defense Strategy for Balancing Safety and Usability in Large Language Models
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arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866915702439411712 |
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| author | Gu, Haoran Wang, Handing Mei, Yi Zhang, Mengjie Jin, Yaochu |
| author_facet | Gu, Haoran Wang, Handing Mei, Yi Zhang, Mengjie Jin, Yaochu |
| contents | Large Language Models (LLMs) have been extensively used across diverse domains, including virtual assistants, automated code generation, and scientific research. However, they remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, which manipulate the models into generating harmful responses despite safety alignment. Recent studies have shown that current safety-aligned LLMs undergo shallow safety alignment. In this work, we conduct an in-depth investigation into the underlying mechanism of this phenomenon and reveal that it manifests through learned ''safety trigger tokens'' that activate the model's safety patterns when paired with the specific input. Through both analysis and empirical verification, we further demonstrate the high similarity of the safety trigger tokens across different harmful inputs. Accordingly, we propose D-STT, a simple yet effective defense algorithm that identifies and explicitly decodes safety trigger tokens of the given safety-aligned LLM to activate the model's learned safety patterns. In this process, the safety trigger is constrained to a single token, which effectively preserves model usability by introducing minimum intervention in the decoding process. Extensive experiments across diverse jailbreak attacks and benign prompts demonstrate that D-STT significantly reduces output harmfulness while preserving model usability and incurring negligible response time overhead, outperforming ten baseline methods. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_07167 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | One Trigger Token Is Enough: A Defense Strategy for Balancing Safety and Usability in Large Language Models Gu, Haoran Wang, Handing Mei, Yi Zhang, Mengjie Jin, Yaochu Cryptography and Security Computation and Language Large Language Models (LLMs) have been extensively used across diverse domains, including virtual assistants, automated code generation, and scientific research. However, they remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, which manipulate the models into generating harmful responses despite safety alignment. Recent studies have shown that current safety-aligned LLMs undergo shallow safety alignment. In this work, we conduct an in-depth investigation into the underlying mechanism of this phenomenon and reveal that it manifests through learned ''safety trigger tokens'' that activate the model's safety patterns when paired with the specific input. Through both analysis and empirical verification, we further demonstrate the high similarity of the safety trigger tokens across different harmful inputs. Accordingly, we propose D-STT, a simple yet effective defense algorithm that identifies and explicitly decodes safety trigger tokens of the given safety-aligned LLM to activate the model's learned safety patterns. In this process, the safety trigger is constrained to a single token, which effectively preserves model usability by introducing minimum intervention in the decoding process. Extensive experiments across diverse jailbreak attacks and benign prompts demonstrate that D-STT significantly reduces output harmfulness while preserving model usability and incurring negligible response time overhead, outperforming ten baseline methods. |
| title | One Trigger Token Is Enough: A Defense Strategy for Balancing Safety and Usability in Large Language Models |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Computation and Language |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.07167 |