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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.07212 |
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| _version_ | 1866912492174704640 |
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| author | Shafin, Ashfaq Ali Ahmed, Khandaker Mamun |
| author_facet | Shafin, Ashfaq Ali Ahmed, Khandaker Mamun |
| contents | State-sponsored influence operations (SIOs) have become a pervasive and complex challenge in the digital age, particularly on social media platforms where information spreads rapidly and with minimal oversight. These operations are strategically employed by nation-state actors to manipulate public opinion, exacerbate social divisions, and project geopolitical narratives, often through the dissemination of misleading or inflammatory content. Despite increasing awareness of their existence, the specific linguistic and emotional strategies employed by these campaigns remain underexplored. This study addresses this gap by conducting a comprehensive analysis of sentiment, emotional valence, and abusive language across 2 million tweets attributed to influence operations linked to China, Iran, and Russia, using Twitter's publicly released dataset of state-affiliated accounts. We identify distinct affective and rhetorical patterns that characterize each nation's digital propaganda. Russian campaigns predominantly deploy negative sentiment and toxic language to intensify polarization and destabilize discourse. In contrast, Iranian operations blend antagonistic and supportive tones to simultaneously incite conflict and foster ideological alignment. Chinese activities emphasize positive sentiment and emotionally neutral rhetoric to promote favorable narratives and subtly influence global perceptions. These findings reveal how state actors tailor their information warfare tactics to achieve specific geopolitical objectives through differentiated content strategies. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_07212 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The Language of Influence: Sentiment, Emotion, and Hate Speech in State Sponsored Influence Operations Shafin, Ashfaq Ali Ahmed, Khandaker Mamun Social and Information Networks State-sponsored influence operations (SIOs) have become a pervasive and complex challenge in the digital age, particularly on social media platforms where information spreads rapidly and with minimal oversight. These operations are strategically employed by nation-state actors to manipulate public opinion, exacerbate social divisions, and project geopolitical narratives, often through the dissemination of misleading or inflammatory content. Despite increasing awareness of their existence, the specific linguistic and emotional strategies employed by these campaigns remain underexplored. This study addresses this gap by conducting a comprehensive analysis of sentiment, emotional valence, and abusive language across 2 million tweets attributed to influence operations linked to China, Iran, and Russia, using Twitter's publicly released dataset of state-affiliated accounts. We identify distinct affective and rhetorical patterns that characterize each nation's digital propaganda. Russian campaigns predominantly deploy negative sentiment and toxic language to intensify polarization and destabilize discourse. In contrast, Iranian operations blend antagonistic and supportive tones to simultaneously incite conflict and foster ideological alignment. Chinese activities emphasize positive sentiment and emotionally neutral rhetoric to promote favorable narratives and subtly influence global perceptions. These findings reveal how state actors tailor their information warfare tactics to achieve specific geopolitical objectives through differentiated content strategies. |
| title | The Language of Influence: Sentiment, Emotion, and Hate Speech in State Sponsored Influence Operations |
| topic | Social and Information Networks |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.07212 |