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Hauptverfasser: Xu, Renzhe, Wang, Kang, Li, Bo
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2025
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.07688
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author Xu, Renzhe
Wang, Kang
Li, Bo
author_facet Xu, Renzhe
Wang, Kang
Li, Bo
contents Data heterogeneity across multiple sources is common in real-world machine learning (ML) settings. Although many methods focus on enabling a single model to handle diverse data, real-world markets often comprise multiple competing ML providers. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic framework -- the Heterogeneous Data Game -- to analyze how such providers compete across heterogeneous data sources. We investigate the resulting pure Nash equilibria (PNE), showing that they can be non-existent, homogeneous (all providers converge on the same model), or heterogeneous (providers specialize in distinct data sources). Our analysis spans monopolistic, duopolistic, and more general markets, illustrating how factors such as the "temperature" of data-source choice models and the dominance of certain data sources shape equilibrium outcomes. We offer theoretical insights into both homogeneous and heterogeneous PNEs, guiding regulatory policies and practical strategies for competitive ML marketplaces.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_07688
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Heterogeneous Data Game: Characterizing the Model Competition Across Multiple Data Sources
Xu, Renzhe
Wang, Kang
Li, Bo
Computer Science and Game Theory
Machine Learning
Data heterogeneity across multiple sources is common in real-world machine learning (ML) settings. Although many methods focus on enabling a single model to handle diverse data, real-world markets often comprise multiple competing ML providers. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic framework -- the Heterogeneous Data Game -- to analyze how such providers compete across heterogeneous data sources. We investigate the resulting pure Nash equilibria (PNE), showing that they can be non-existent, homogeneous (all providers converge on the same model), or heterogeneous (providers specialize in distinct data sources). Our analysis spans monopolistic, duopolistic, and more general markets, illustrating how factors such as the "temperature" of data-source choice models and the dominance of certain data sources shape equilibrium outcomes. We offer theoretical insights into both homogeneous and heterogeneous PNEs, guiding regulatory policies and practical strategies for competitive ML marketplaces.
title Heterogeneous Data Game: Characterizing the Model Competition Across Multiple Data Sources
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
Machine Learning
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.07688