SAFE-SiP: Secure Authentication Framework for System-in-Package Using Multi-party Computation
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866916828512518144 |
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| author | Tashdid, Ishraq Farheen, Tasnuva Rahman, Sazadur |
| author_facet | Tashdid, Ishraq Farheen, Tasnuva Rahman, Sazadur |
| contents | The emergence of chiplet-based heterogeneous integration is transforming the semiconductor, AI, and high-performance computing industries by enabling modular designs and improved scalability. However, assembling chiplets from multiple vendors after fabrication introduces a complex supply chain that raises serious security concerns, including counterfeiting, overproduction, and unauthorized access. Current solutions often depend on dedicated security chiplets or changes to the timing flow, which assume a trusted SiP integrator. This assumption can expose chiplet signatures to other vendors and create new attack surfaces. This work addresses those vulnerabilities using Multi-party Computation (MPC), which enables zero-trust authentication without disclosing sensitive information to any party. We present SAFE-SiP, a scalable authentication framework that garbles chiplet signatures and uses MPC for verifying integrity, effectively blocking unauthorized access and adversarial inference. SAFE-SiP removes the need for a dedicated security chiplet and ensures secure authentication, even in untrusted integration scenarios. We evaluated SAFE-SiP on five RISC-V-based System-in-Package (SiP) designs. Experimental results show that SAFE-SiP incurs minimal power overhead, an average area overhead of only 3.05%, and maintains a computational complexity of 2^192, offering a highly efficient and scalable security solution. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_09002 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | SAFE-SiP: Secure Authentication Framework for System-in-Package Using Multi-party Computation Tashdid, Ishraq Farheen, Tasnuva Rahman, Sazadur Cryptography and Security B.6.1; D.4.6; K.6.5 The emergence of chiplet-based heterogeneous integration is transforming the semiconductor, AI, and high-performance computing industries by enabling modular designs and improved scalability. However, assembling chiplets from multiple vendors after fabrication introduces a complex supply chain that raises serious security concerns, including counterfeiting, overproduction, and unauthorized access. Current solutions often depend on dedicated security chiplets or changes to the timing flow, which assume a trusted SiP integrator. This assumption can expose chiplet signatures to other vendors and create new attack surfaces. This work addresses those vulnerabilities using Multi-party Computation (MPC), which enables zero-trust authentication without disclosing sensitive information to any party. We present SAFE-SiP, a scalable authentication framework that garbles chiplet signatures and uses MPC for verifying integrity, effectively blocking unauthorized access and adversarial inference. SAFE-SiP removes the need for a dedicated security chiplet and ensures secure authentication, even in untrusted integration scenarios. We evaluated SAFE-SiP on five RISC-V-based System-in-Package (SiP) designs. Experimental results show that SAFE-SiP incurs minimal power overhead, an average area overhead of only 3.05%, and maintains a computational complexity of 2^192, offering a highly efficient and scalable security solution. |
| title | SAFE-SiP: Secure Authentication Framework for System-in-Package Using Multi-party Computation |
| topic | Cryptography and Security B.6.1; D.4.6; K.6.5 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.09002 |