Nonstationary nonzero-sum Markov games under a probability criterion
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866918021585436672 |
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| author | Guo, Xin Wen, Xin |
| author_facet | Guo, Xin Wen, Xin |
| contents | This paper deals with N-person nonzero-sum discrete-time Markov games under a probability criterion, in which the transition probabilities and reward functions are allowed to vary with time. Differing from the existing works on the expected reward criteria, our concern here is to maximize the probabilities that the accumulated rewards until the first passage time to any target set exceed a given goal, which represent the reliability of the players income. Under a mild condition, by developing a comparison theorem for the probability criterion, we prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium over history-dependent policies. Moreover, we provide an efficient algorithm for computing epsilon-Nash equilibria. Finally, we illustrate our main results by a nonstationary energy management model and take a numerical experiment. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_10126 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Nonstationary nonzero-sum Markov games under a probability criterion Guo, Xin Wen, Xin Probability Optimization and Control This paper deals with N-person nonzero-sum discrete-time Markov games under a probability criterion, in which the transition probabilities and reward functions are allowed to vary with time. Differing from the existing works on the expected reward criteria, our concern here is to maximize the probabilities that the accumulated rewards until the first passage time to any target set exceed a given goal, which represent the reliability of the players income. Under a mild condition, by developing a comparison theorem for the probability criterion, we prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium over history-dependent policies. Moreover, we provide an efficient algorithm for computing epsilon-Nash equilibria. Finally, we illustrate our main results by a nonstationary energy management model and take a numerical experiment. |
| title | Nonstationary nonzero-sum Markov games under a probability criterion |
| topic | Probability Optimization and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.10126 |