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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.12490 |
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| _version_ | 1866912558448902144 |
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| author | Louck, Yedidel Stulman, Ariel Dvir, Amit |
| author_facet | Louck, Yedidel Stulman, Ariel Dvir, Amit |
| contents | Googles A2A protocol provides a secure communication framework for AI agents but demonstrates critical limitations when handling highly sensitive information such as payment credentials and identity documents. These gaps increase the risk of unintended harms, including unauthorized disclosure, privilege escalation, and misuse of private data in generative multi-agent environments. In this paper, we identify key weaknesses of A2A: insufficient token lifetime control, lack of strong customer authentication, overbroad access scopes, and missing consent flows. We propose protocol-level enhancements grounded in a structured threat model for semi-trusted multi-agent systems. Our refinements introduce explicit consent orchestration, ephemeral scoped tokens, and direct user-to-service data channels to minimize exposure across time, context, and topology. Empirical evaluation using adversarial prompt injection tests shows that the enhanced protocol substantially reduces sensitive data leakage while maintaining low communication latency. Comparative analysis highlights the advantages of our approach over both the original A2A specification and related academic proposals. These contributions establish a practical path for evolving A2A into a privacy-preserving framework that mitigates unintended harms in multi-agent generative AI systems. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_12490 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Improving Google A2A Protocol: Protecting Sensitive Data and Mitigating Unintended Harms in Multi-Agent Systems Louck, Yedidel Stulman, Ariel Dvir, Amit Cryptography and Security Googles A2A protocol provides a secure communication framework for AI agents but demonstrates critical limitations when handling highly sensitive information such as payment credentials and identity documents. These gaps increase the risk of unintended harms, including unauthorized disclosure, privilege escalation, and misuse of private data in generative multi-agent environments. In this paper, we identify key weaknesses of A2A: insufficient token lifetime control, lack of strong customer authentication, overbroad access scopes, and missing consent flows. We propose protocol-level enhancements grounded in a structured threat model for semi-trusted multi-agent systems. Our refinements introduce explicit consent orchestration, ephemeral scoped tokens, and direct user-to-service data channels to minimize exposure across time, context, and topology. Empirical evaluation using adversarial prompt injection tests shows that the enhanced protocol substantially reduces sensitive data leakage while maintaining low communication latency. Comparative analysis highlights the advantages of our approach over both the original A2A specification and related academic proposals. These contributions establish a practical path for evolving A2A into a privacy-preserving framework that mitigates unintended harms in multi-agent generative AI systems. |
| title | Improving Google A2A Protocol: Protecting Sensitive Data and Mitigating Unintended Harms in Multi-Agent Systems |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.12490 |