Compile-Time Fully Homomorphic Encryption of Vectors: Eliminating Online Encryption via Algebraic Basis Synthesis

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Author: Zhao, Dongfang
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
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author Zhao, Dongfang
author_facet Zhao, Dongfang
contents We propose a framework for compile-time ciphertext synthesis in fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) systems, where ciphertexts are constructed from precomputed encrypted basis vectors combined with a runtime-scaled encryption of zero. This design eliminates online encryption and instead relies solely on ciphertext-level additions and scalar multiplications, enabling efficient data ingestion and algebraic reuse. We formalize the method as a randomized $\mathbb{Z}_t$-module morphism and prove that it satisfies IND-CPA security under standard assumptions. The proof uses a hybrid game reduction, showing that adversarial advantage in distinguishing synthesized ciphertexts is negligible if the underlying FHE scheme is IND-CPA secure. Unlike prior designs that require a pool of random encryptions of zero, our construction achieves equivalent security using a single zero ciphertext multiplied by a fresh scalar at runtime, reducing memory overhead while preserving ciphertext randomness. The resulting primitive supports efficient integration with standard FHE APIs and maintains compatibility with batching, rotation, and aggregation, making it well-suited for encrypted databases, streaming pipelines, and secure compiler backends.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_12582
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Compile-Time Fully Homomorphic Encryption of Vectors: Eliminating Online Encryption via Algebraic Basis Synthesis
Zhao, Dongfang
Cryptography and Security
We propose a framework for compile-time ciphertext synthesis in fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) systems, where ciphertexts are constructed from precomputed encrypted basis vectors combined with a runtime-scaled encryption of zero. This design eliminates online encryption and instead relies solely on ciphertext-level additions and scalar multiplications, enabling efficient data ingestion and algebraic reuse. We formalize the method as a randomized $\mathbb{Z}_t$-module morphism and prove that it satisfies IND-CPA security under standard assumptions. The proof uses a hybrid game reduction, showing that adversarial advantage in distinguishing synthesized ciphertexts is negligible if the underlying FHE scheme is IND-CPA secure. Unlike prior designs that require a pool of random encryptions of zero, our construction achieves equivalent security using a single zero ciphertext multiplied by a fresh scalar at runtime, reducing memory overhead while preserving ciphertext randomness. The resulting primitive supports efficient integration with standard FHE APIs and maintains compatibility with batching, rotation, and aggregation, making it well-suited for encrypted databases, streaming pipelines, and secure compiler backends.
title Compile-Time Fully Homomorphic Encryption of Vectors: Eliminating Online Encryption via Algebraic Basis Synthesis
topic Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.12582