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Revenue-Optimal Efficient Mechanism Design with General Type Spaces

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Prasad, Siddharth, Balcan, Maria-Florina, Sandholm, Tuomas
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2025
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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