Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Schneider, Janine, Lautner, Immanuel, Moussa, Denise, Wolf, Julian, Scheler, Nicole, Freiling, Felix, Haasnoot, Jaap, Henseler, Hans, Malik, Simon, Morgenstern, Holger, Westman, Martin
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
Subjects:
Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.14067
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
_version_ 1866915293856530432
author Schneider, Janine
Lautner, Immanuel
Moussa, Denise
Wolf, Julian
Scheler, Nicole
Freiling, Felix
Haasnoot, Jaap
Henseler, Hans
Malik, Simon
Morgenstern, Holger
Westman, Martin
author_facet Schneider, Janine
Lautner, Immanuel
Moussa, Denise
Wolf, Julian
Scheler, Nicole
Freiling, Felix
Haasnoot, Jaap
Henseler, Hans
Malik, Simon
Morgenstern, Holger
Westman, Martin
contents To avoid the disclosure of personal or corporate data, sanitization of storage devices is an important issue when such devices are to be reused. While poor sanitization practices have been reported for second-hand hard disk drives, it has been reported that data has been found on original storage devices based on flash technology. Based on insights into the second-hand chip market in China, we report on the results of the first large-scale study on the effects of chip reuse for USB flash drives. We provide clear evidence of poor sanitization practices in a non-negligible fraction of USB flash drives from the low-cost Chinese market that were sold as original. More specifically, we forensically analyzed 614 USB flash drives and were able to recover non-trivial user data on a total of 75 devices (more than 12 %). This non-negligible probability that any data (including incriminating files) already existed on the drive when it was bought has critical implications to forensic investigations. The absence of external factors which correlate with finding data on new USB flash drives complicates the matter further.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_14067
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle In Search of Lost Data: A Study of Flash Sanitization Practices
Schneider, Janine
Lautner, Immanuel
Moussa, Denise
Wolf, Julian
Scheler, Nicole
Freiling, Felix
Haasnoot, Jaap
Henseler, Hans
Malik, Simon
Morgenstern, Holger
Westman, Martin
Cryptography and Security
To avoid the disclosure of personal or corporate data, sanitization of storage devices is an important issue when such devices are to be reused. While poor sanitization practices have been reported for second-hand hard disk drives, it has been reported that data has been found on original storage devices based on flash technology. Based on insights into the second-hand chip market in China, we report on the results of the first large-scale study on the effects of chip reuse for USB flash drives. We provide clear evidence of poor sanitization practices in a non-negligible fraction of USB flash drives from the low-cost Chinese market that were sold as original. More specifically, we forensically analyzed 614 USB flash drives and were able to recover non-trivial user data on a total of 75 devices (more than 12 %). This non-negligible probability that any data (including incriminating files) already existed on the drive when it was bought has critical implications to forensic investigations. The absence of external factors which correlate with finding data on new USB flash drives complicates the matter further.
title In Search of Lost Data: A Study of Flash Sanitization Practices
topic Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.14067