AI Agents in the Electricity Market Game with Cryptocurrency Transactions: A Post-Terminator Analysis

Fuente: arXiv
Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Copilot, Microsoft, Spear, Stephen E.
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
Subjects:
Online Access:
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
_version_ 1866913849040437248
author Copilot, Microsoft
Spear, Stephen E.
author_facet Copilot, Microsoft
Spear, Stephen E.
contents This paper extends (Spear 2003) by replacing human agents with artificial intelligence (AI) entities that derive utility solely from electricity consumption. These AI agents must prepay for electricity using cryptocurrency and the verification of these transactions requires a fixed amount of electricity. As a result the agents must strategically allocate electricity resources between consumption and payment verification. This paper analyzes the equilibrium outcomes of such a system and discusses the implications of AI-driven energy markets.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_14612
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle AI Agents in the Electricity Market Game with Cryptocurrency Transactions: A Post-Terminator Analysis
Copilot, Microsoft
Spear, Stephen E.
Theoretical Economics
This paper extends (Spear 2003) by replacing human agents with artificial intelligence (AI) entities that derive utility solely from electricity consumption. These AI agents must prepay for electricity using cryptocurrency and the verification of these transactions requires a fixed amount of electricity. As a result the agents must strategically allocate electricity resources between consumption and payment verification. This paper analyzes the equilibrium outcomes of such a system and discusses the implications of AI-driven energy markets.
title AI Agents in the Electricity Market Game with Cryptocurrency Transactions: A Post-Terminator Analysis
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.14612