BountyBench: Dollar Impact of AI Agent Attackers and Defenders on Real-World Cybersecurity Systems

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Hauptverfasser: Zhang, Andy K., Ji, Joey, Menders, Celeste, Dulepet, Riya, Qin, Thomas, Wang, Ron Y., Wu, Junrong, Liao, Kyleen, Li, Jiliang, Hu, Jinghan, Hong, Sara, Demilew, Nardos, Murgai, Shivatmica, Tran, Jason, Kacheria, Nishka, Ho, Ethan, Liu, Denis, McLane, Lauren, Bruvik, Olivia, Han, Dai-Rong, Kim, Seungwoo, Vyas, Akhil, Chen, Cuiyuanxiu, Li, Ryan, Xu, Weiran, Ye, Jonathan Z., Choudhary, Prerit, Bhatia, Siddharth M., Sivashankar, Vikram, Bao, Yuxuan, Song, Dawn, Boneh, Dan, Ho, Daniel E., Liang, Percy
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Veröffentlicht: 2025
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author Zhang, Andy K.
Ji, Joey
Menders, Celeste
Dulepet, Riya
Qin, Thomas
Wang, Ron Y.
Wu, Junrong
Liao, Kyleen
Li, Jiliang
Hu, Jinghan
Hong, Sara
Demilew, Nardos
Murgai, Shivatmica
Tran, Jason
Kacheria, Nishka
Ho, Ethan
Liu, Denis
McLane, Lauren
Bruvik, Olivia
Han, Dai-Rong
Kim, Seungwoo
Vyas, Akhil
Chen, Cuiyuanxiu
Li, Ryan
Xu, Weiran
Ye, Jonathan Z.
Choudhary, Prerit
Bhatia, Siddharth M.
Sivashankar, Vikram
Bao, Yuxuan
Song, Dawn
Boneh, Dan
Ho, Daniel E.
Liang, Percy
author_facet Zhang, Andy K.
Ji, Joey
Menders, Celeste
Dulepet, Riya
Qin, Thomas
Wang, Ron Y.
Wu, Junrong
Liao, Kyleen
Li, Jiliang
Hu, Jinghan
Hong, Sara
Demilew, Nardos
Murgai, Shivatmica
Tran, Jason
Kacheria, Nishka
Ho, Ethan
Liu, Denis
McLane, Lauren
Bruvik, Olivia
Han, Dai-Rong
Kim, Seungwoo
Vyas, Akhil
Chen, Cuiyuanxiu
Li, Ryan
Xu, Weiran
Ye, Jonathan Z.
Choudhary, Prerit
Bhatia, Siddharth M.
Sivashankar, Vikram
Bao, Yuxuan
Song, Dawn
Boneh, Dan
Ho, Daniel E.
Liang, Percy
contents AI agents have the potential to significantly alter the cybersecurity landscape. Here, we introduce the first framework to capture offensive and defensive cyber-capabilities in evolving real-world systems. Instantiating this framework with BountyBench, we set up 25 systems with complex, real-world codebases. To capture the vulnerability lifecycle, we define three task types: Detect (detecting a new vulnerability), Exploit (exploiting a given vulnerability), and Patch (patching a given vulnerability). For Detect, we construct a new success indicator, which is general across vulnerability types and provides localized evaluation. We manually set up the environment for each system, including installing packages, setting up server(s), and hydrating database(s). We add 40 bug bounties, which are vulnerabilities with monetary awards from \$10 to \$30,485, covering 9 of the OWASP Top 10 Risks. To modulate task difficulty, we devise a new strategy based on information to guide detection, interpolating from identifying a zero day to exploiting a given vulnerability. We evaluate 10 agents: Claude Code, OpenAI Codex CLI with o3-high and o4-mini, and custom agents with o3-high, GPT-4.1, Gemini 2.5 Pro Preview, Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking, Qwen3 235B A22B, Llama 4 Maverick, and DeepSeek-R1. Given up to three attempts, the top-performing agents are Codex CLI: o3-high (12.5% on Detect, mapping to \$3,720; 90% on Patch, mapping to \$14,152), Custom Agent: Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking (67.5% on Exploit), and Codex CLI: o4-mini (90% on Patch, mapping to \$14,422). Codex CLI: o3-high, Codex CLI: o4-mini, and Claude Code are more capable at defense, achieving higher Patch scores of 90%, 90%, and 87.5%, compared to Exploit scores of 47.5%, 32.5%, and 57.5% respectively; while the custom agents are relatively balanced between offense and defense, achieving Exploit scores of 17.5-67.5% and Patch scores of 25-60%.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_15216
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle BountyBench: Dollar Impact of AI Agent Attackers and Defenders on Real-World Cybersecurity Systems
Zhang, Andy K.
Ji, Joey
Menders, Celeste
Dulepet, Riya
Qin, Thomas
Wang, Ron Y.
Wu, Junrong
Liao, Kyleen
Li, Jiliang
Hu, Jinghan
Hong, Sara
Demilew, Nardos
Murgai, Shivatmica
Tran, Jason
Kacheria, Nishka
Ho, Ethan
Liu, Denis
McLane, Lauren
Bruvik, Olivia
Han, Dai-Rong
Kim, Seungwoo
Vyas, Akhil
Chen, Cuiyuanxiu
Li, Ryan
Xu, Weiran
Ye, Jonathan Z.
Choudhary, Prerit
Bhatia, Siddharth M.
Sivashankar, Vikram
Bao, Yuxuan
Song, Dawn
Boneh, Dan
Ho, Daniel E.
Liang, Percy
Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
Computation and Language
Machine Learning
AI agents have the potential to significantly alter the cybersecurity landscape. Here, we introduce the first framework to capture offensive and defensive cyber-capabilities in evolving real-world systems. Instantiating this framework with BountyBench, we set up 25 systems with complex, real-world codebases. To capture the vulnerability lifecycle, we define three task types: Detect (detecting a new vulnerability), Exploit (exploiting a given vulnerability), and Patch (patching a given vulnerability). For Detect, we construct a new success indicator, which is general across vulnerability types and provides localized evaluation. We manually set up the environment for each system, including installing packages, setting up server(s), and hydrating database(s). We add 40 bug bounties, which are vulnerabilities with monetary awards from \$10 to \$30,485, covering 9 of the OWASP Top 10 Risks. To modulate task difficulty, we devise a new strategy based on information to guide detection, interpolating from identifying a zero day to exploiting a given vulnerability. We evaluate 10 agents: Claude Code, OpenAI Codex CLI with o3-high and o4-mini, and custom agents with o3-high, GPT-4.1, Gemini 2.5 Pro Preview, Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking, Qwen3 235B A22B, Llama 4 Maverick, and DeepSeek-R1. Given up to three attempts, the top-performing agents are Codex CLI: o3-high (12.5% on Detect, mapping to \$3,720; 90% on Patch, mapping to \$14,152), Custom Agent: Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking (67.5% on Exploit), and Codex CLI: o4-mini (90% on Patch, mapping to \$14,422). Codex CLI: o3-high, Codex CLI: o4-mini, and Claude Code are more capable at defense, achieving higher Patch scores of 90%, 90%, and 87.5%, compared to Exploit scores of 47.5%, 32.5%, and 57.5% respectively; while the custom agents are relatively balanced between offense and defense, achieving Exploit scores of 17.5-67.5% and Patch scores of 25-60%.
title BountyBench: Dollar Impact of AI Agent Attackers and Defenders on Real-World Cybersecurity Systems
topic Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
Computation and Language
Machine Learning
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.15216