Comparison of Oracles
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
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| _version_ | 1866914570159783936 |
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| author | Lagziel, David Lehrer, Ehud Wang, Tao |
| author_facet | Lagziel, David Lehrer, Ehud Wang, Tao |
| contents | We analyze incomplete-information games where an oracle publicly shares information with players. One oracle dominates another if, in every game, it can match the set of equilibrium outcomes induced by the latter. Distinct characterizations are provided for deterministic and stochastic signaling functions, based on simultaneous posterior matching, partition refinements, and common knowledge components. This study extends the work of Blackwell (1951) to games, and expands the study of Aumann (1976) on common knowledge, along with the companion Part II, which develops a theory of information loops. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_15955 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Comparison of Oracles Lagziel, David Lehrer, Ehud Wang, Tao Theoretical Economics We analyze incomplete-information games where an oracle publicly shares information with players. One oracle dominates another if, in every game, it can match the set of equilibrium outcomes induced by the latter. Distinct characterizations are provided for deterministic and stochastic signaling functions, based on simultaneous posterior matching, partition refinements, and common knowledge components. This study extends the work of Blackwell (1951) to games, and expands the study of Aumann (1976) on common knowledge, along with the companion Part II, which develops a theory of information loops. |
| title | Comparison of Oracles |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.15955 |