Evaluating Voting Design Vulnerabilities for Retroactive Funding
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866910961487577088 |
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| author | Yu, Jay Bennett, Austin Gao, Billy Joseph, Rebecca |
| author_facet | Yu, Jay Bennett, Austin Gao, Billy Joseph, Rebecca |
| contents | Retroactive Public Goods Funding (RetroPGF) rewards blockchain projects based on proven impact rather than future promises. This paper reviews voting mechanisms for Optimism's RetroPGF, where "badgeholders" allocate rewards to valuable projects. We explore Optimism's previous schemes for RetroPGF voting, including quadratic, mean, and median voting. We present a proof-based formal analysis for vulnerabilities in these voting schemes, empirically validate these vulnerabilities using voting simulations, and offer assessments and practical recommendations for future iterations of Optimism's system based on our findings. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_16068 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Evaluating Voting Design Vulnerabilities for Retroactive Funding Yu, Jay Bennett, Austin Gao, Billy Joseph, Rebecca Computer Science and Game Theory Retroactive Public Goods Funding (RetroPGF) rewards blockchain projects based on proven impact rather than future promises. This paper reviews voting mechanisms for Optimism's RetroPGF, where "badgeholders" allocate rewards to valuable projects. We explore Optimism's previous schemes for RetroPGF voting, including quadratic, mean, and median voting. We present a proof-based formal analysis for vulnerabilities in these voting schemes, empirically validate these vulnerabilities using voting simulations, and offer assessments and practical recommendations for future iterations of Optimism's system based on our findings. |
| title | Evaluating Voting Design Vulnerabilities for Retroactive Funding |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.16068 |