Guardado en:
| Autores principales: | , , , , , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.16241 |
| Etiquetas: |
Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
|
| _version_ | 1866916758716153856 |
|---|---|
| author | Nguyen, Viet-Anh Zhao, Shiqian Dao, Gia Hu, Runyi Xie, Yi Tuan, Luu Anh |
| author_facet | Nguyen, Viet-Anh Zhao, Shiqian Dao, Gia Hu, Runyi Xie, Yi Tuan, Luu Anh |
| contents | Recently, Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated superior logical capabilities compared to traditional Large Language Models (LLMs), gaining significant attention. Despite their impressive performance, the potential for stronger reasoning abilities to introduce more severe security vulnerabilities remains largely underexplored. Existing jailbreak methods often struggle to balance effectiveness with robustness against adaptive safety mechanisms. In this work, we propose SEAL, a novel jailbreak attack that targets LRMs through an adaptive encryption pipeline designed to override their reasoning processes and evade potential adaptive alignment. Specifically, SEAL introduces a stacked encryption approach that combines multiple ciphers to overwhelm the models reasoning capabilities, effectively bypassing built-in safety mechanisms. To further prevent LRMs from developing countermeasures, we incorporate two dynamic strategies - random and adaptive - that adjust the cipher length, order, and combination. Extensive experiments on real-world reasoning models, including DeepSeek-R1, Claude Sonnet, and OpenAI GPT-o4, validate the effectiveness of our approach. Notably, SEAL achieves an attack success rate of 80.8% on GPT o4-mini, outperforming state-of-the-art baselines by a significant margin of 27.2%. Warning: This paper contains examples of inappropriate, offensive, and harmful content. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_16241 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Three Minds, One Legend: Jailbreak Large Reasoning Model with Adaptive Stacked Ciphers Nguyen, Viet-Anh Zhao, Shiqian Dao, Gia Hu, Runyi Xie, Yi Tuan, Luu Anh Computation and Language Recently, Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated superior logical capabilities compared to traditional Large Language Models (LLMs), gaining significant attention. Despite their impressive performance, the potential for stronger reasoning abilities to introduce more severe security vulnerabilities remains largely underexplored. Existing jailbreak methods often struggle to balance effectiveness with robustness against adaptive safety mechanisms. In this work, we propose SEAL, a novel jailbreak attack that targets LRMs through an adaptive encryption pipeline designed to override their reasoning processes and evade potential adaptive alignment. Specifically, SEAL introduces a stacked encryption approach that combines multiple ciphers to overwhelm the models reasoning capabilities, effectively bypassing built-in safety mechanisms. To further prevent LRMs from developing countermeasures, we incorporate two dynamic strategies - random and adaptive - that adjust the cipher length, order, and combination. Extensive experiments on real-world reasoning models, including DeepSeek-R1, Claude Sonnet, and OpenAI GPT-o4, validate the effectiveness of our approach. Notably, SEAL achieves an attack success rate of 80.8% on GPT o4-mini, outperforming state-of-the-art baselines by a significant margin of 27.2%. Warning: This paper contains examples of inappropriate, offensive, and harmful content. |
| title | Three Minds, One Legend: Jailbreak Large Reasoning Model with Adaptive Stacked Ciphers |
| topic | Computation and Language |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.16241 |