Strategic Content Creation with Age of GenAI: To Share or Not to Share?
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866915890090475520 |
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| author | Keinan, Gur Ben-Porat, Omer |
| author_facet | Keinan, Gur Ben-Porat, Omer |
| contents | We introduce a game-theoretic framework examining strategic interactions between a platform and its content creators in the presence of AI-generated content. Our model's main novelty is in capturing creators' dual strategic decisions: The investment in content quality and their (possible) consent to share their content with the platform's GenAI, both of which significantly impact their utility. To incentivize creators, the platform strategically allocates a portion of its GenAI-driven revenue to creators who share their content. We focus on the class of full-sharing equilibrium profiles, in which all creators willingly share their content with the platform's GenAI system. Such equilibria are highly desirable both theoretically and practically. Our main technical contribution is formulating and efficiently solving a novel optimization problem that approximates the platform's optimal revenue subject to inducing a full-sharing equilibrium. A key aspect of our approach is identifying conditions under which full-sharing equilibria exist and a surprising connection to the Prisoner's Dilemma. Finally, our simulations demonstrate how revenue-allocation mechanisms affect creator utility and the platform's revenue. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_16358 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Strategic Content Creation with Age of GenAI: To Share or Not to Share? Keinan, Gur Ben-Porat, Omer Computer Science and Game Theory We introduce a game-theoretic framework examining strategic interactions between a platform and its content creators in the presence of AI-generated content. Our model's main novelty is in capturing creators' dual strategic decisions: The investment in content quality and their (possible) consent to share their content with the platform's GenAI, both of which significantly impact their utility. To incentivize creators, the platform strategically allocates a portion of its GenAI-driven revenue to creators who share their content. We focus on the class of full-sharing equilibrium profiles, in which all creators willingly share their content with the platform's GenAI system. Such equilibria are highly desirable both theoretically and practically. Our main technical contribution is formulating and efficiently solving a novel optimization problem that approximates the platform's optimal revenue subject to inducing a full-sharing equilibrium. A key aspect of our approach is identifying conditions under which full-sharing equilibria exist and a surprising connection to the Prisoner's Dilemma. Finally, our simulations demonstrate how revenue-allocation mechanisms affect creator utility and the platform's revenue. |
| title | Strategic Content Creation with Age of GenAI: To Share or Not to Share? |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.16358 |