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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.18094 |
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| _version_ | 1866908376544313344 |
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| author | Patty, John W. Penn, Elizabeth Maggie |
| author_facet | Patty, John W. Penn, Elizabeth Maggie |
| contents | We demonstrate that the set of cost distributions under which the optimal strategy for maximizing compliance (or more generally, effort) in a binary choice environment is identical to the optimal strategy for maximizing the accuracy of the reward (minimizing Type-I and Type-II errors) is finitely shy (Anderson and Zame (2001) in the space of all smooth parameterized real-valued distributions possessing full support on the real line. In words, this implies that maximizing compliance and maximizing accuracy "almost always" call for different incentive schemes. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_18094 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Accuracy Is (Generically) Bad For Compliance Patty, John W. Penn, Elizabeth Maggie Theoretical Economics We demonstrate that the set of cost distributions under which the optimal strategy for maximizing compliance (or more generally, effort) in a binary choice environment is identical to the optimal strategy for maximizing the accuracy of the reward (minimizing Type-I and Type-II errors) is finitely shy (Anderson and Zame (2001) in the space of all smooth parameterized real-valued distributions possessing full support on the real line. In words, this implies that maximizing compliance and maximizing accuracy "almost always" call for different incentive schemes. |
| title | Accuracy Is (Generically) Bad For Compliance |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.18094 |