Co-evolutionary Dynamics of Attack and Defence in Cybersecurity
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866913858298314752 |
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| author | Bashir, Adeela Shamszaman, Zia Ush Song, Zhao Han, The Anh |
| author_facet | Bashir, Adeela Shamszaman, Zia Ush Song, Zhao Han, The Anh |
| contents | In the evolving digital landscape, it is crucial to study the dynamics of cyberattacks and defences. This study uses an Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) framework to investigate the evolutionary dynamics of attacks and defences in cyberspace. We develop a two-population asymmetric game between attacker and defender to capture the essential factors of costs, potential benefits, and the probability of successful defences. Through mathematical analysis and numerical simulations, we find that systems with high defence intensities show stability with minimal attack frequencies, whereas low-defence environments show instability, and are vulnerable to attacks. Furthermore, we find five equilibria, where the strategy pair always defend and attack emerged as the most likely stable state as cyber domain is characterised by a continuous battle between defenders and attackers. Our theoretical findings align with real-world data from past cyber incidents, demonstrating the interdisciplinary impact, such as fraud detection, risk management and cybersecurity decision-making. Overall, our analysis suggests that adaptive cybersecurity strategies based on EGT can improve resource allocation, enhance system resilience, and reduce the overall risk of cyberattacks. By incorporating real-world data, this study demonstrates the applicability of EGT in addressing the evolving nature of cyber threats and the need for secure digital ecosystems through strategic planning and proactive defence measures. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_19338 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Co-evolutionary Dynamics of Attack and Defence in Cybersecurity Bashir, Adeela Shamszaman, Zia Ush Song, Zhao Han, The Anh Computer Science and Game Theory Cryptography and Security Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems In the evolving digital landscape, it is crucial to study the dynamics of cyberattacks and defences. This study uses an Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) framework to investigate the evolutionary dynamics of attacks and defences in cyberspace. We develop a two-population asymmetric game between attacker and defender to capture the essential factors of costs, potential benefits, and the probability of successful defences. Through mathematical analysis and numerical simulations, we find that systems with high defence intensities show stability with minimal attack frequencies, whereas low-defence environments show instability, and are vulnerable to attacks. Furthermore, we find five equilibria, where the strategy pair always defend and attack emerged as the most likely stable state as cyber domain is characterised by a continuous battle between defenders and attackers. Our theoretical findings align with real-world data from past cyber incidents, demonstrating the interdisciplinary impact, such as fraud detection, risk management and cybersecurity decision-making. Overall, our analysis suggests that adaptive cybersecurity strategies based on EGT can improve resource allocation, enhance system resilience, and reduce the overall risk of cyberattacks. By incorporating real-world data, this study demonstrates the applicability of EGT in addressing the evolving nature of cyber threats and the need for secure digital ecosystems through strategic planning and proactive defence measures. |
| title | Co-evolutionary Dynamics of Attack and Defence in Cybersecurity |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Cryptography and Security Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.19338 |