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Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers

Fuente: arXiv

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Lucier, Brendan, Saxena, Raghuvansh R.
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2025
Materias:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

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