A Framework for Combined Transaction Posting and Pricing for Layer 2 Blockchains
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Main Authors: | Wang, Shouqiao, Crapis, Davide, Moallemi, Ciamac C. |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
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