Distributed equilibrium seeking in aggregative games: linear convergence under singular perturbations lens

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Carnevale, Guido, Fabiani, Filippo, Fele, Filiberto, Margellos, Kostas, Notarstefano, Giuseppe
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
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author Carnevale, Guido
Fabiani, Filippo
Fele, Filiberto
Margellos, Kostas
Notarstefano, Giuseppe
author_facet Carnevale, Guido
Fabiani, Filippo
Fele, Filiberto
Margellos, Kostas
Notarstefano, Giuseppe
contents We present a fully-distributed algorithm for Nash equilibrium seeking in aggregative games over networks. The proposed scheme endows each agent with a gradient-based scheme equipped with a tracking mechanism to locally reconstruct the aggregative variable, which is not available to the agents. We show that our method falls into the framework of singularly perturbed systems, as it involves the interconnection between a fast subsystem - the global information reconstruction dynamics - with a slow one concerning the optimization of the local strategies. This perspective plays a key role in analyzing the scheme with a constant stepsize, and in proving its linear convergence to the Nash equilibrium in strongly monotone games with local constraints. By exploiting the flexibility of our aggregative variable definition (not necessarily the arithmetic average of the agents' strategy), we show the efficacy of our algorithm on a realistic voltage support case study for the smart grid.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_21386
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Distributed equilibrium seeking in aggregative games: linear convergence under singular perturbations lens
Carnevale, Guido
Fabiani, Filippo
Fele, Filiberto
Margellos, Kostas
Notarstefano, Giuseppe
Systems and Control
Computer Science and Game Theory
Optimization and Control
We present a fully-distributed algorithm for Nash equilibrium seeking in aggregative games over networks. The proposed scheme endows each agent with a gradient-based scheme equipped with a tracking mechanism to locally reconstruct the aggregative variable, which is not available to the agents. We show that our method falls into the framework of singularly perturbed systems, as it involves the interconnection between a fast subsystem - the global information reconstruction dynamics - with a slow one concerning the optimization of the local strategies. This perspective plays a key role in analyzing the scheme with a constant stepsize, and in proving its linear convergence to the Nash equilibrium in strongly monotone games with local constraints. By exploiting the flexibility of our aggregative variable definition (not necessarily the arithmetic average of the agents' strategy), we show the efficacy of our algorithm on a realistic voltage support case study for the smart grid.
title Distributed equilibrium seeking in aggregative games: linear convergence under singular perturbations lens
topic Systems and Control
Computer Science and Game Theory
Optimization and Control
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.21386