Properties of zero-determinant strategies in multichannel games

Fuente: arXiv
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1. Verfasser: Ueda, Masahiko
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2025
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author Ueda, Masahiko
author_facet Ueda, Masahiko
contents Controlling payoffs in repeated games is one of the important topics in control theory of multi-agent systems. Recently proposed zero-determinant strategies enable players to unilaterally enforce linear relations between payoffs. Furthermore, based on the mathematics of zero-determinant strategies, regional payoff control, in which payoffs are enforced into some feasible regions, has been discovered in social dilemma situations. More recently, theory of payoff control was extended to multichannel games, where players parallelly interact with each other in multiple channels. However, the existence of payoff-controlling strategies in multichannel games seems to require the existence of payoff-controlling strategies in some channels, and properties of zero-determinant strategies specific to multichannel games are still not clear. In this paper, we elucidate properties of zero-determinant strategies in multichannel games. First, we relate the existence condition of zero-determinant strategies in multichannel games to that of zero-determinant strategies in each channel. We then show that the existence of zero-determinant strategies in multichannel games requires the existence of zero-determinant strategies in some channels. This result implies that the existence of zero-determinant strategies in multichannel games is tightly restricted by structure of games played in each channel.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_21952
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Properties of zero-determinant strategies in multichannel games
Ueda, Masahiko
Physics and Society
Computer Science and Game Theory
Multiagent Systems
Systems and Control
Controlling payoffs in repeated games is one of the important topics in control theory of multi-agent systems. Recently proposed zero-determinant strategies enable players to unilaterally enforce linear relations between payoffs. Furthermore, based on the mathematics of zero-determinant strategies, regional payoff control, in which payoffs are enforced into some feasible regions, has been discovered in social dilemma situations. More recently, theory of payoff control was extended to multichannel games, where players parallelly interact with each other in multiple channels. However, the existence of payoff-controlling strategies in multichannel games seems to require the existence of payoff-controlling strategies in some channels, and properties of zero-determinant strategies specific to multichannel games are still not clear. In this paper, we elucidate properties of zero-determinant strategies in multichannel games. First, we relate the existence condition of zero-determinant strategies in multichannel games to that of zero-determinant strategies in each channel. We then show that the existence of zero-determinant strategies in multichannel games requires the existence of zero-determinant strategies in some channels. This result implies that the existence of zero-determinant strategies in multichannel games is tightly restricted by structure of games played in each channel.
title Properties of zero-determinant strategies in multichannel games
topic Physics and Society
Computer Science and Game Theory
Multiagent Systems
Systems and Control
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.21952