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Optimal Auction Design for Dynamic Stochastic Environments: Myerson Meets Naor

Fuente: arXiv

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux:	Che, Yeon-Koo, Choi, Andrew B.
Format:	Preprint
Publié:	2025
Sujets:	Theoretical Economics
Accès en ligne:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Ajouter un tag Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!

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