Phase transitions in the Prisoner's Dilemma game on the Barabási-Albert graph with participation cost
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866912402318032896 |
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| author | Miȩkisz, Jacek Mohamadichamgavi, Javad |
| author_facet | Miȩkisz, Jacek Mohamadichamgavi, Javad |
| contents | We examine the impact of the maintenance cost of social links on cooperative behavior in the Prisoner's Dilemma game on the Barabási-Albert scale-free network with a pairwise stochastic imitation. We show by means of Monte Carlo simulations and pair approximation that the cooperation frequency changes abruptly from an almost full cooperation to a much smaller value when we increase the cost of maintaining links. In the critical region, the stationary distribution is bi-modal and the system oscillates between two states: the state with almost full cooperation and one with coexisting strategies. We show that the critical region shrinks with the increasing size of the population. However, the expected time the system spends in a metastable state before switching to the other one does not change as a function of the system's size, which precludes the existence of two stationary states in the thermodynamic limit of the infinite population. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_23370 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Phase transitions in the Prisoner's Dilemma game on the Barabási-Albert graph with participation cost Miȩkisz, Jacek Mohamadichamgavi, Javad Populations and Evolution Statistical Mechanics Physics and Society We examine the impact of the maintenance cost of social links on cooperative behavior in the Prisoner's Dilemma game on the Barabási-Albert scale-free network with a pairwise stochastic imitation. We show by means of Monte Carlo simulations and pair approximation that the cooperation frequency changes abruptly from an almost full cooperation to a much smaller value when we increase the cost of maintaining links. In the critical region, the stationary distribution is bi-modal and the system oscillates between two states: the state with almost full cooperation and one with coexisting strategies. We show that the critical region shrinks with the increasing size of the population. However, the expected time the system spends in a metastable state before switching to the other one does not change as a function of the system's size, which precludes the existence of two stationary states in the thermodynamic limit of the infinite population. |
| title | Phase transitions in the Prisoner's Dilemma game on the Barabási-Albert graph with participation cost |
| topic | Populations and Evolution Statistical Mechanics Physics and Society |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.23370 |