Gatekeeping, Selection, and Welfare

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Del Prato, Francesco, Zacchia, Paolo
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
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author Del Prato, Francesco
Zacchia, Paolo
author_facet Del Prato, Francesco
Zacchia, Paolo
contents We study staged entry with costly gatekeeping in a differentiated-products economy: entrepreneurs observe noisy signals before paying a resource-intensive activation cost. Precision improves selection but requires more resources, reducing entry and variety: welfare need not rise with precision. Under CES preferences, the activation cutoff is efficient as profit displacement offsets the consumer-surplus gain from variety. Welfare losses arise from verification costs shrinking the feasible set of varieties, not from misaligned incentives. Because the market responds efficiently to any given regime, these losses cannot be corrected via Pigouvian taxes.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_24460
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Gatekeeping, Selection, and Welfare
Del Prato, Francesco
Zacchia, Paolo
General Economics
Economics
We study staged entry with costly gatekeeping in a differentiated-products economy: entrepreneurs observe noisy signals before paying a resource-intensive activation cost. Precision improves selection but requires more resources, reducing entry and variety: welfare need not rise with precision. Under CES preferences, the activation cutoff is efficient as profit displacement offsets the consumer-surplus gain from variety. Welfare losses arise from verification costs shrinking the feasible set of varieties, not from misaligned incentives. Because the market responds efficiently to any given regime, these losses cannot be corrected via Pigouvian taxes.
title Gatekeeping, Selection, and Welfare
topic General Economics
Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.24460