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Online Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design with Predictions

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Amanatidis, Georgios, Markakis, Evangelos, Santorinaios, Christodoulos, Schäfer, Guido, Tsamopoulos, Panagiotis, Tsikiridis, Artem
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2025
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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