Note on the size of a stable matching
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866913867698798592 |
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| author | Gutin, Gregory Z. Neary, Philip R. Yeo, Anders |
| author_facet | Gutin, Gregory Z. Neary, Philip R. Yeo, Anders |
| contents | Consider a one-to-one two-sided matching market with workers on one side and single-position firms on the other, and suppose that the largest individually rational matching contains $n$ pairs. We show that the number of workers employed and positions filled in every stable matching is bounded from below by $\lceil\frac{n}{2}\rceil$ and we characterise the class of preferences that attain the bound. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_24637 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Note on the size of a stable matching Gutin, Gregory Z. Neary, Philip R. Yeo, Anders Theoretical Economics Consider a one-to-one two-sided matching market with workers on one side and single-position firms on the other, and suppose that the largest individually rational matching contains $n$ pairs. We show that the number of workers employed and positions filled in every stable matching is bounded from below by $\lceil\frac{n}{2}\rceil$ and we characterise the class of preferences that attain the bound. |
| title | Note on the size of a stable matching |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.24637 |