PatchDEMUX: A Certifiably Robust Framework for Multi-label Classifiers Against Adversarial Patches
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866908386329624576 |
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| author | Jacob, Dennis Xiang, Chong Mittal, Prateek |
| author_facet | Jacob, Dennis Xiang, Chong Mittal, Prateek |
| contents | Deep learning techniques have enabled vast improvements in computer vision technologies. Nevertheless, these models are vulnerable to adversarial patch attacks which catastrophically impair performance. The physically realizable nature of these attacks calls for certifiable defenses, which feature provable guarantees on robustness. While certifiable defenses have been successfully applied to single-label classification, limited work has been done for multi-label classification. In this work, we present PatchDEMUX, a certifiably robust framework for multi-label classifiers against adversarial patches. Our approach is a generalizable method which can extend any existing certifiable defense for single-label classification; this is done by considering the multi-label classification task as a series of isolated binary classification problems to provably guarantee robustness. Furthermore, in the scenario where an attacker is limited to a single patch we propose an additional certification procedure that can provide tighter robustness bounds. Using the current state-of-the-art (SOTA) single-label certifiable defense PatchCleanser as a backbone, we find that PatchDEMUX can achieve non-trivial robustness on the MS-COCO and PASCAL VOC datasets while maintaining high clean performance |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2505_24703 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | PatchDEMUX: A Certifiably Robust Framework for Multi-label Classifiers Against Adversarial Patches Jacob, Dennis Xiang, Chong Mittal, Prateek Cryptography and Security Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Machine Learning Deep learning techniques have enabled vast improvements in computer vision technologies. Nevertheless, these models are vulnerable to adversarial patch attacks which catastrophically impair performance. The physically realizable nature of these attacks calls for certifiable defenses, which feature provable guarantees on robustness. While certifiable defenses have been successfully applied to single-label classification, limited work has been done for multi-label classification. In this work, we present PatchDEMUX, a certifiably robust framework for multi-label classifiers against adversarial patches. Our approach is a generalizable method which can extend any existing certifiable defense for single-label classification; this is done by considering the multi-label classification task as a series of isolated binary classification problems to provably guarantee robustness. Furthermore, in the scenario where an attacker is limited to a single patch we propose an additional certification procedure that can provide tighter robustness bounds. Using the current state-of-the-art (SOTA) single-label certifiable defense PatchCleanser as a backbone, we find that PatchDEMUX can achieve non-trivial robustness on the MS-COCO and PASCAL VOC datasets while maintaining high clean performance |
| title | PatchDEMUX: A Certifiably Robust Framework for Multi-label Classifiers Against Adversarial Patches |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Machine Learning |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.24703 |