Depermissioning Web3: a Permissionless Accountable RPC Protocol for Blockchain Networks
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arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866913882531954688 |
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| author | Wang, Weihong Van Cutsem, Tom |
| author_facet | Wang, Weihong Van Cutsem, Tom |
| contents | In blockchain networks, so-called "full nodes" serve data to and relay transactions from clients through an RPC interface. This serving layer enables integration of "Web3" data, stored on blockchains, with "Web2" mobile or web applications that cannot directly participate as peers in a blockchain network. In practice, the serving layer is dominated by a small number of centralized services ("node providers") that offer permissioned access to RPC endpoints. Clients register with these providers because they offer reliable and convenient access to blockchain data: operating a full node themselves requires significant computational and storage resources, and public (permissionless) RPC nodes lack financial incentives to serve large numbers of clients with consistent performance.
Permissioned access to an otherwise permissionless blockchain network raises concerns regarding the privacy, integrity, and availability of data access. To address this, we propose a Permissionless Accountable RPC Protocol (PARP). It enables clients and full nodes to interact pseudonymously while keeping both parties accountable. PARP leverages "light client" schemes for essential data integrity checks, combined with fraud proofs, to keep full nodes honest and accountable. It integrates payment channels to facilitate micro-payments, holding clients accountable for the resources they consume and providing an economic incentive for full nodes to serve. Our prototype implementation for Ethereum demonstrates the feasibility of PARP, and we quantify its overhead compared to the base RPC protocol. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2506_03940 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Depermissioning Web3: a Permissionless Accountable RPC Protocol for Blockchain Networks Wang, Weihong Van Cutsem, Tom Cryptography and Security Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing In blockchain networks, so-called "full nodes" serve data to and relay transactions from clients through an RPC interface. This serving layer enables integration of "Web3" data, stored on blockchains, with "Web2" mobile or web applications that cannot directly participate as peers in a blockchain network. In practice, the serving layer is dominated by a small number of centralized services ("node providers") that offer permissioned access to RPC endpoints. Clients register with these providers because they offer reliable and convenient access to blockchain data: operating a full node themselves requires significant computational and storage resources, and public (permissionless) RPC nodes lack financial incentives to serve large numbers of clients with consistent performance. Permissioned access to an otherwise permissionless blockchain network raises concerns regarding the privacy, integrity, and availability of data access. To address this, we propose a Permissionless Accountable RPC Protocol (PARP). It enables clients and full nodes to interact pseudonymously while keeping both parties accountable. PARP leverages "light client" schemes for essential data integrity checks, combined with fraud proofs, to keep full nodes honest and accountable. It integrates payment channels to facilitate micro-payments, holding clients accountable for the resources they consume and providing an economic incentive for full nodes to serve. Our prototype implementation for Ethereum demonstrates the feasibility of PARP, and we quantify its overhead compared to the base RPC protocol. |
| title | Depermissioning Web3: a Permissionless Accountable RPC Protocol for Blockchain Networks |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.03940 |