Authenticated Private Set Intersection: A Merkle Tree-Based Approach for Enhancing Data Integrity

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Gong, Zixian, Zheng, Zhiyong, Hu, Zhe, Tian, Kun, Zhang, Yi, Oleksiy, Zhedanov, Liu, Fengxia
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
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author Gong, Zixian
Zheng, Zhiyong
Hu, Zhe
Tian, Kun
Zhang, Yi
Oleksiy, Zhedanov
Liu, Fengxia
author_facet Gong, Zixian
Zheng, Zhiyong
Hu, Zhe
Tian, Kun
Zhang, Yi
Oleksiy, Zhedanov
Liu, Fengxia
contents Private Set Intersection (PSI) enables secure computation of set intersections while preserving participant privacy, standard PSI existing protocols remain vulnerable to data integrity attacks allowing malicious participants to extract additional intersection information or mislead other parties. In this paper, we propose the definition of data integrity in PSI and construct two authenticated PSI schemes by integrating Merkle Trees with state-of-the-art two-party volePSI and multi-party mPSI protocols. The resulting two-party authenticated PSI achieves communication complexity $\mathcal{O}(n λ+n \log n)$, aligning with the best-known unauthenticated PSI schemes, while the multi-party construction is $\mathcal{O}(n κ+n \log n)$ which introduces additional overhead due to Merkle tree inclusion proofs. Due to the incorporation of integrity verification, our authenticated schemes incur higher costs compared to state-of-the-art unauthenticated schemes. We also provide efficient implementations of our protocols and discuss potential improvements, including alternative authentication blocks.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2506_04647
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Authenticated Private Set Intersection: A Merkle Tree-Based Approach for Enhancing Data Integrity
Gong, Zixian
Zheng, Zhiyong
Hu, Zhe
Tian, Kun
Zhang, Yi
Oleksiy, Zhedanov
Liu, Fengxia
Cryptography and Security
Private Set Intersection (PSI) enables secure computation of set intersections while preserving participant privacy, standard PSI existing protocols remain vulnerable to data integrity attacks allowing malicious participants to extract additional intersection information or mislead other parties. In this paper, we propose the definition of data integrity in PSI and construct two authenticated PSI schemes by integrating Merkle Trees with state-of-the-art two-party volePSI and multi-party mPSI protocols. The resulting two-party authenticated PSI achieves communication complexity $\mathcal{O}(n λ+n \log n)$, aligning with the best-known unauthenticated PSI schemes, while the multi-party construction is $\mathcal{O}(n κ+n \log n)$ which introduces additional overhead due to Merkle tree inclusion proofs. Due to the incorporation of integrity verification, our authenticated schemes incur higher costs compared to state-of-the-art unauthenticated schemes. We also provide efficient implementations of our protocols and discuss potential improvements, including alternative authentication blocks.
title Authenticated Private Set Intersection: A Merkle Tree-Based Approach for Enhancing Data Integrity
topic Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.04647