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| Main Authors: | , , , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.04743 |
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| _version_ | 1866918204869181440 |
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| author | Xu, Shuhan Liang, Siyuan Zheng, Hongling Liu, Aishan Wang, Xinbiao Luo, Yong Lin, Fu Rutkowski, Leszek Tao, Dacheng |
| author_facet | Xu, Shuhan Liang, Siyuan Zheng, Hongling Liu, Aishan Wang, Xinbiao Luo, Yong Lin, Fu Rutkowski, Leszek Tao, Dacheng |
| contents | Visual language models (VLMs) have made significant progress in image captioning tasks, yet recent studies have found they are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Attackers can inject undetectable perturbations into the data during inference, triggering abnormal behavior and generating malicious captions. These attacks are particularly challenging to detect and defend against due to the stealthiness and cross-modal propagation of the trigger signals. In this paper, we identify two key vulnerabilities by analyzing existing attack patterns: (1) the model exhibits abnormal attention concentration on certain regions of the input image, and (2) backdoor attacks often induce semantic drift and sentence incoherence. Based on these insights, we propose Semantic Reward Defense (SRD), a reinforcement learning framework that mitigates backdoor behavior without requiring any prior knowledge of trigger patterns. SRD learns to apply discrete perturbations to sensitive contextual regions of image inputs via a deep Q-network policy, aiming to confuse attention and disrupt the activation of malicious paths. To guide policy optimization, we design a reward signal named semantic fidelity score, which jointly assesses the semantic consistency and linguistic fluency of the generated captions, encouraging the agent to achieve a robust yet faithful output. SRD offers a trigger-agnostic, policy-interpretable defense paradigm that effectively mitigates local (TrojVLM) and global (Shadowcast) backdoor attacks, reducing ASR to 3.6% and 5.6% respectively, with less than 15% average CIDEr drop on the clean inputs. Our codes can be found at https://github.com/Ciconey/SRD.git. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2506_04743 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | SRD: Reinforcement-Learned Semantic Perturbation for Backdoor Defense in VLMs Xu, Shuhan Liang, Siyuan Zheng, Hongling Liu, Aishan Wang, Xinbiao Luo, Yong Lin, Fu Rutkowski, Leszek Tao, Dacheng Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Visual language models (VLMs) have made significant progress in image captioning tasks, yet recent studies have found they are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Attackers can inject undetectable perturbations into the data during inference, triggering abnormal behavior and generating malicious captions. These attacks are particularly challenging to detect and defend against due to the stealthiness and cross-modal propagation of the trigger signals. In this paper, we identify two key vulnerabilities by analyzing existing attack patterns: (1) the model exhibits abnormal attention concentration on certain regions of the input image, and (2) backdoor attacks often induce semantic drift and sentence incoherence. Based on these insights, we propose Semantic Reward Defense (SRD), a reinforcement learning framework that mitigates backdoor behavior without requiring any prior knowledge of trigger patterns. SRD learns to apply discrete perturbations to sensitive contextual regions of image inputs via a deep Q-network policy, aiming to confuse attention and disrupt the activation of malicious paths. To guide policy optimization, we design a reward signal named semantic fidelity score, which jointly assesses the semantic consistency and linguistic fluency of the generated captions, encouraging the agent to achieve a robust yet faithful output. SRD offers a trigger-agnostic, policy-interpretable defense paradigm that effectively mitigates local (TrojVLM) and global (Shadowcast) backdoor attacks, reducing ASR to 3.6% and 5.6% respectively, with less than 15% average CIDEr drop on the clean inputs. Our codes can be found at https://github.com/Ciconey/SRD.git. |
| title | SRD: Reinforcement-Learned Semantic Perturbation for Backdoor Defense in VLMs |
| topic | Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.04743 |