Invisible Backdoor Triggers in Image Editing Model via Deep Watermarking

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Chen, Yu-Feng, Huang, Tzuhsuan, Chiu, Pin-Yen, Chen, Jun-Cheng
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
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author Chen, Yu-Feng
Huang, Tzuhsuan
Chiu, Pin-Yen
Chen, Jun-Cheng
author_facet Chen, Yu-Feng
Huang, Tzuhsuan
Chiu, Pin-Yen
Chen, Jun-Cheng
contents Diffusion models have achieved remarkable progress in both image generation and editing. However, recent studies have revealed their vulnerability to backdoor attacks, in which specific patterns embedded in the input can manipulate the model's behavior. Most existing research in this area has proposed attack frameworks focused on the image generation pipeline, leaving backdoor attacks in image editing relatively unexplored. Among the few studies targeting image editing, most utilize visible triggers, which are impractical because they introduce noticeable alterations to the input image before editing. In this paper, we propose a novel attack framework that embeds invisible triggers into the image editing process via poisoned training data. We leverage off-the-shelf deep watermarking models to encode imperceptible watermarks as backdoor triggers. Our goal is to make the model produce the predefined backdoor target when it receives watermarked inputs, while editing clean images normally according to the given prompt. With extensive experiments across different watermarking models, the proposed method achieves promising attack success rates. In addition, the analysis results of the watermark characteristics in term of backdoor attack further support the effectiveness of our approach. The code is available at:https://github.com/aiiu-lab/BackdoorImageEditing
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2506_04879
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Invisible Backdoor Triggers in Image Editing Model via Deep Watermarking
Chen, Yu-Feng
Huang, Tzuhsuan
Chiu, Pin-Yen
Chen, Jun-Cheng
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
Diffusion models have achieved remarkable progress in both image generation and editing. However, recent studies have revealed their vulnerability to backdoor attacks, in which specific patterns embedded in the input can manipulate the model's behavior. Most existing research in this area has proposed attack frameworks focused on the image generation pipeline, leaving backdoor attacks in image editing relatively unexplored. Among the few studies targeting image editing, most utilize visible triggers, which are impractical because they introduce noticeable alterations to the input image before editing. In this paper, we propose a novel attack framework that embeds invisible triggers into the image editing process via poisoned training data. We leverage off-the-shelf deep watermarking models to encode imperceptible watermarks as backdoor triggers. Our goal is to make the model produce the predefined backdoor target when it receives watermarked inputs, while editing clean images normally according to the given prompt. With extensive experiments across different watermarking models, the proposed method achieves promising attack success rates. In addition, the analysis results of the watermark characteristics in term of backdoor attack further support the effectiveness of our approach. The code is available at:https://github.com/aiiu-lab/BackdoorImageEditing
title Invisible Backdoor Triggers in Image Editing Model via Deep Watermarking
topic Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.04879