Can In-Context Reinforcement Learning Recover From Reward Poisoning Attacks?
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arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2025
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| author | Sasnauskas, Paulius Yalın, Yiğit Radanović, Goran |
| author_facet | Sasnauskas, Paulius Yalın, Yiğit Radanović, Goran |
| contents | We study the corruption-robustness of in-context reinforcement learning (ICRL), focusing on the Decision-Pretrained Transformer (DPT, Lee et al., 2023). To address the challenge of reward poisoning attacks targeting the DPT, we propose a novel adversarial training framework, called Adversarially Trained Decision-Pretrained Transformer (AT-DPT). Our method simultaneously trains an attacker to minimize the true reward of the DPT by poisoning environment rewards, and a DPT model to infer optimal actions from the poisoned data. We evaluate the effectiveness of our approach against standard bandit algorithms, including robust baselines designed to handle reward contamination. Our results show that the proposed method significantly outperforms these baselines in bandit settings, under a learned attacker. We additionally evaluate AT-DPT on an adaptive attacker, and observe similar results. Furthermore, we extend our evaluation to the MDP setting, confirming that the robustness observed in bandit scenarios generalizes to more complex environments. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2506_06891 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Can In-Context Reinforcement Learning Recover From Reward Poisoning Attacks? Sasnauskas, Paulius Yalın, Yiğit Radanović, Goran Machine Learning Cryptography and Security We study the corruption-robustness of in-context reinforcement learning (ICRL), focusing on the Decision-Pretrained Transformer (DPT, Lee et al., 2023). To address the challenge of reward poisoning attacks targeting the DPT, we propose a novel adversarial training framework, called Adversarially Trained Decision-Pretrained Transformer (AT-DPT). Our method simultaneously trains an attacker to minimize the true reward of the DPT by poisoning environment rewards, and a DPT model to infer optimal actions from the poisoned data. We evaluate the effectiveness of our approach against standard bandit algorithms, including robust baselines designed to handle reward contamination. Our results show that the proposed method significantly outperforms these baselines in bandit settings, under a learned attacker. We additionally evaluate AT-DPT on an adaptive attacker, and observe similar results. Furthermore, we extend our evaluation to the MDP setting, confirming that the robustness observed in bandit scenarios generalizes to more complex environments. |
| title | Can In-Context Reinforcement Learning Recover From Reward Poisoning Attacks? |
| topic | Machine Learning Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.06891 |