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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.07291 |
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| _version_ | 1866912419021848576 |
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| author | Andraos, Maria Ghossoub, Mario Zhu, Michael B. |
| author_facet | Andraos, Maria Ghossoub, Mario Zhu, Michael B. |
| contents | We consider a model of a reinsurance market consisting of multiple insurers on the demand side and multiple reinsurers on the supply side, thereby providing a unifying framework and extension of the recent literature on optimality and equilibria in reinsurance markets. Each insurer has preferences represented by a general Choquet risk measure and can purchase coverage from any or all reinsurers. Each reinsurer has preferences represented by a general Choquet risk measure and can provide coverage to any or all insurers. Pricing in this market is done via a nonlinear pricing rule given by a Choquet integral. We model the market as a sequential game in which the reinsurers have the first-move advantage. We characterize the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria in this market in some cases of interest, and we examine their Pareto efficiency. In addition, we consider two special cases of our model that correspond to existing models in the related literature, and we show how our findings extend these previous results. Finally, we illustrate our results in a numerical example. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2506_07291 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria in Large Reinsurance Markets Andraos, Maria Ghossoub, Mario Zhu, Michael B. Risk Management We consider a model of a reinsurance market consisting of multiple insurers on the demand side and multiple reinsurers on the supply side, thereby providing a unifying framework and extension of the recent literature on optimality and equilibria in reinsurance markets. Each insurer has preferences represented by a general Choquet risk measure and can purchase coverage from any or all reinsurers. Each reinsurer has preferences represented by a general Choquet risk measure and can provide coverage to any or all insurers. Pricing in this market is done via a nonlinear pricing rule given by a Choquet integral. We model the market as a sequential game in which the reinsurers have the first-move advantage. We characterize the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria in this market in some cases of interest, and we examine their Pareto efficiency. In addition, we consider two special cases of our model that correspond to existing models in the related literature, and we show how our findings extend these previous results. Finally, we illustrate our results in a numerical example. |
| title | Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria in Large Reinsurance Markets |
| topic | Risk Management |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.07291 |