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| Hauptverfasser: | , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2025
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.07467 |
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| _version_ | 1866910995724632064 |
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| author | Peng, Jie Yang, Hongwei Zhao, Jing Dong, Hengji He, Hui Zhang, Weizhe He, Haoyu |
| author_facet | Peng, Jie Yang, Hongwei Zhao, Jing Dong, Hengji He, Hui Zhang, Weizhe He, Haoyu |
| contents | Deep neural networks are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where malicious behaviors are implanted during training. While existing defenses can effectively purify compromised models, they typically require labeled data or specific training procedures, making them difficult to apply beyond supervised learning settings. Notably, recent studies have shown successful backdoor attacks across various learning paradigms, highlighting a critical security concern. To address this gap, we propose Two-stage Symmetry Connectivity (TSC), a novel backdoor purification defense that operates independently of data format and requires only a small fraction of clean samples. Through theoretical analysis, we prove that by leveraging permutation invariance in neural networks and quadratic mode connectivity, TSC amplifies the loss on poisoned samples while maintaining bounded clean accuracy. Experiments demonstrate that TSC achieves robust performance comparable to state-of-the-art methods in supervised learning scenarios. Furthermore, TSC generalizes to self-supervised learning frameworks, such as SimCLR and CLIP, maintaining its strong defense capabilities. Our code is available at https://github.com/JiePeng104/TSC. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2506_07467 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Circumventing Backdoor Space via Weight Symmetry Peng, Jie Yang, Hongwei Zhao, Jing Dong, Hengji He, Hui Zhang, Weizhe He, Haoyu Machine Learning Deep neural networks are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where malicious behaviors are implanted during training. While existing defenses can effectively purify compromised models, they typically require labeled data or specific training procedures, making them difficult to apply beyond supervised learning settings. Notably, recent studies have shown successful backdoor attacks across various learning paradigms, highlighting a critical security concern. To address this gap, we propose Two-stage Symmetry Connectivity (TSC), a novel backdoor purification defense that operates independently of data format and requires only a small fraction of clean samples. Through theoretical analysis, we prove that by leveraging permutation invariance in neural networks and quadratic mode connectivity, TSC amplifies the loss on poisoned samples while maintaining bounded clean accuracy. Experiments demonstrate that TSC achieves robust performance comparable to state-of-the-art methods in supervised learning scenarios. Furthermore, TSC generalizes to self-supervised learning frameworks, such as SimCLR and CLIP, maintaining its strong defense capabilities. Our code is available at https://github.com/JiePeng104/TSC. |
| title | Circumventing Backdoor Space via Weight Symmetry |
| topic | Machine Learning |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.07467 |