Mean-Field-Type Game Theory with Rosenblatt Noise

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Tembine, Hamidou, Duncan, Tyrone E., Pasik-Duncan, Bozenna
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
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author Tembine, Hamidou
Duncan, Tyrone E.
Pasik-Duncan, Bozenna
author_facet Tembine, Hamidou
Duncan, Tyrone E.
Pasik-Duncan, Bozenna
contents We study the integration of Rosenblatt noise into stochastic systems, control theory, and mean-field-type game theory, addressing the limitations of traditional Gaussian and Markovian models. Empirical evidence from various domains, including water demand, e-commerce, power grid operations, wireless channels, and agricultural supply chains, demonstrates the prevalence of non-Gaussian characteristics such as skews, heavy tails and strong long-range dependencies. The Rosenblatt process, a non-Gaussian non-Markovian, self-similar process, offers a baseline framework for capturing some the behaviors observed in real data. We develop novel stochastic calculus formulas for Rosenblatt processes, apply these to dynamical systems, and analyze optimal control problems, revealing the suboptimality of traditional noise approximation methods. We extend game-theoretic analysis to environments driven by Rosenblatt noise, establishing conditions for saddle-point equilibria in zero-sum games and identifying state-feedback Nash equilibria in non-zero-sum games. Our findings underscore the importance of incorporating non-Gaussian noise into predictive analytics and control strategies, enhancing the accuracy and robustness of models in real-world applications. These findings represent a significant advancement in mean-field-type game theory with variance-awareness, offering new insights and tools for managing interactive systems influenced by Rosenblatt noise.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2506_08025
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Mean-Field-Type Game Theory with Rosenblatt Noise
Tembine, Hamidou
Duncan, Tyrone E.
Pasik-Duncan, Bozenna
Optimization and Control
Computer Science and Game Theory
We study the integration of Rosenblatt noise into stochastic systems, control theory, and mean-field-type game theory, addressing the limitations of traditional Gaussian and Markovian models. Empirical evidence from various domains, including water demand, e-commerce, power grid operations, wireless channels, and agricultural supply chains, demonstrates the prevalence of non-Gaussian characteristics such as skews, heavy tails and strong long-range dependencies. The Rosenblatt process, a non-Gaussian non-Markovian, self-similar process, offers a baseline framework for capturing some the behaviors observed in real data. We develop novel stochastic calculus formulas for Rosenblatt processes, apply these to dynamical systems, and analyze optimal control problems, revealing the suboptimality of traditional noise approximation methods. We extend game-theoretic analysis to environments driven by Rosenblatt noise, establishing conditions for saddle-point equilibria in zero-sum games and identifying state-feedback Nash equilibria in non-zero-sum games. Our findings underscore the importance of incorporating non-Gaussian noise into predictive analytics and control strategies, enhancing the accuracy and robustness of models in real-world applications. These findings represent a significant advancement in mean-field-type game theory with variance-awareness, offering new insights and tools for managing interactive systems influenced by Rosenblatt noise.
title Mean-Field-Type Game Theory with Rosenblatt Noise
topic Optimization and Control
Computer Science and Game Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.08025