On whether quantum theory needs complex numbers: the foil theories perspective
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arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , , , , , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| author | Yīng, Yìlè Alañón, Maria Ciudad Centeno, Daniel Surace, Jacopo Ansanelli, Marina Maciel Liu, Ruizhi Schmid, David Spekkens, Robert W. |
| author_facet | Yīng, Yìlè Alañón, Maria Ciudad Centeno, Daniel Surace, Jacopo Ansanelli, Marina Maciel Liu, Ruizhi Schmid, David Spekkens, Robert W. |
| contents | Recent work by Renou et al. (2021) has led to some controversy concerning the question of whether quantum theory requires complex numbers for its formulation. We promote the view that the main result of that work is best understood not as a claim about the relative merits of different representations of quantum theory, but rather as a claim about the possibility of experimentally adjudicating between standard quantum theory and an alternative theory -- a foil theory -- known as real-amplitude quantum theory (RQT). In particular, the claim is that this adjudication can be achieved given only an assumption about the causal structure of the experiment. Here, we aim to shed some light on why this is possible, by reconceptualizing the comparison of the two theories as an instance of a broader class of such theory comparisons. By recasting RQT as the subtheory of quantum theory that arises by symmetrizing with respect to the collective action of a time-reversal symmetry, we can compare it to other subtheories that arise by symmetrization, but for different symmetries. If the symmetry has a unitary representation, the resulting foil theory is termed a twirled quantum world, and if it does not (as is the case in RQT), the resulting foil theory is termed a swirled quantum world. We show that, in contrast to RQT, there is no possibility of distinguishing any twirled quantum world from quantum theory given only an assumption about causal structure. We also define analogues of twirling and swirling for an arbitrary generalized probabilistic theory and identify certain necessary conditions on a causal structure for it to be able to support a causal compatibility gap between the theory and its symmetrized version. We draw out the implications of these analyses for the question of how a lack of a shared reference frame state features into the possibility of such a gap. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2506_08091 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | On whether quantum theory needs complex numbers: the foil theories perspective Yīng, Yìlè Alañón, Maria Ciudad Centeno, Daniel Surace, Jacopo Ansanelli, Marina Maciel Liu, Ruizhi Schmid, David Spekkens, Robert W. Quantum Physics Recent work by Renou et al. (2021) has led to some controversy concerning the question of whether quantum theory requires complex numbers for its formulation. We promote the view that the main result of that work is best understood not as a claim about the relative merits of different representations of quantum theory, but rather as a claim about the possibility of experimentally adjudicating between standard quantum theory and an alternative theory -- a foil theory -- known as real-amplitude quantum theory (RQT). In particular, the claim is that this adjudication can be achieved given only an assumption about the causal structure of the experiment. Here, we aim to shed some light on why this is possible, by reconceptualizing the comparison of the two theories as an instance of a broader class of such theory comparisons. By recasting RQT as the subtheory of quantum theory that arises by symmetrizing with respect to the collective action of a time-reversal symmetry, we can compare it to other subtheories that arise by symmetrization, but for different symmetries. If the symmetry has a unitary representation, the resulting foil theory is termed a twirled quantum world, and if it does not (as is the case in RQT), the resulting foil theory is termed a swirled quantum world. We show that, in contrast to RQT, there is no possibility of distinguishing any twirled quantum world from quantum theory given only an assumption about causal structure. We also define analogues of twirling and swirling for an arbitrary generalized probabilistic theory and identify certain necessary conditions on a causal structure for it to be able to support a causal compatibility gap between the theory and its symmetrized version. We draw out the implications of these analyses for the question of how a lack of a shared reference frame state features into the possibility of such a gap. |
| title | On whether quantum theory needs complex numbers: the foil theories perspective |
| topic | Quantum Physics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.08091 |