Guardado en:
| Autores principales: | , , , , , , , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.08442 |
| Etiquetas: |
Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
|
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Online Travel Platforms (OTPs) have been working on improving their hotel Search & Ranking (S&R) systems that facilitate efficient matching between consumers and hotels. Existing OTPs focus almost exclusively on improving platform revenue. In this work, we take a first step in incorporating hotel merchants' objectives into the design of hotel S&R systems to achieve an incentive loop: the OTP tilts impressions and better-ranked positions to merchants with high quality, and in return, the merchants provide better service to consumers. Three critical design challenges need to be resolved to achieve this incentive loop: Matthew Effect in the consumer feedback-loop, unclear relation between hotel quality and performance, and conflicts between short-term and long-term revenue. To address these challenges, we propose MERIT, a MERchant IncenTive ranking model, which can simultaneously take the interests of merchants and consumers into account. We define a new Merchant Competitiveness Index (MCI) to represent hotel merchant quality and propose a new Merchant Tower to model the relation between MCI and ranking scores. Also, we design a monotonic structure for Merchant Tower to provide a clear relation between hotel quality and performance. Finally, we propose a Multi-objective Stratified Pairwise Loss, which can mitigate the conflicts between OTP's short-term and long-term revenue. The offline experiment results indicate that MERIT outperforms these methods in optimizing the demands of consumers and merchants. Furthermore, we conduct an online A/B test and obtain an improvement of 3.02% for the MCI score.