Quantifying Azure RBAC Wildcard Overreach
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866913920795541504 |
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| author | Parisel, Christophe |
| author_facet | Parisel, Christophe |
| contents | Azure RBAC leverages wildcard permissions to simplify policy authoring, but this abstraction often obscures the actual set of allowed operations and undermines least-privilege guarantees. We introduce Belshazaar, a two-stage framework that targets both the effective permission set problem and the evaluation of wildcards permissions spread. First, we formalize Azure action syntax via a context free grammar and implement a compiler that expands any wildcard into its explicit action set. Second, we define an ultrametric diameter metric to quantify semantic overreach in wildcard scenarios. Applied to Microsoft s official catalog of 15481 actions, Belshazaar reveals that about 50 percent of actions admit a cross Resource Provider reach when associated with non obvious wildcards, and that effective permissions sets are effectively computable. These findings demonstrate that wildcard patterns can introduce substantial privilege bloat, and that our approach offers a scalable, semantics driven path toward tighter, least-privilege RBAC policies in Azure environments. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2506_10755 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Quantifying Azure RBAC Wildcard Overreach Parisel, Christophe Cryptography and Security Azure RBAC leverages wildcard permissions to simplify policy authoring, but this abstraction often obscures the actual set of allowed operations and undermines least-privilege guarantees. We introduce Belshazaar, a two-stage framework that targets both the effective permission set problem and the evaluation of wildcards permissions spread. First, we formalize Azure action syntax via a context free grammar and implement a compiler that expands any wildcard into its explicit action set. Second, we define an ultrametric diameter metric to quantify semantic overreach in wildcard scenarios. Applied to Microsoft s official catalog of 15481 actions, Belshazaar reveals that about 50 percent of actions admit a cross Resource Provider reach when associated with non obvious wildcards, and that effective permissions sets are effectively computable. These findings demonstrate that wildcard patterns can introduce substantial privilege bloat, and that our approach offers a scalable, semantics driven path toward tighter, least-privilege RBAC policies in Azure environments. |
| title | Quantifying Azure RBAC Wildcard Overreach |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.10755 |