What Pareto-Efficiency Adjustments Cannot Fix
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866911004794814464 |
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| author | Ortega, Josue Ziegler, Gabriel Arribillaga, R. Pablo Zhao, Geng |
| author_facet | Ortega, Josue Ziegler, Gabriel Arribillaga, R. Pablo Zhao, Geng |
| contents | The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm is stable and strategy-proof, but can produce outcomes that are Pareto-inefficient for students, and thus several alternative mechanisms have been proposed to correct this inefficiency. However, we show that these mechanisms cannot correct DA's rank-inefficiency and inequality, because these shortcomings can arise even in cases where DA is Pareto-efficient.
We also examine students' segregation in settings with advantaged and marginalized students. We prove that the demographic composition of every school is perfectly preserved under any Pareto-efficient mechanism that dominates DA, and consequently fully segregated schools under DA maintain their extreme homogeneity. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2506_11660 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | What Pareto-Efficiency Adjustments Cannot Fix Ortega, Josue Ziegler, Gabriel Arribillaga, R. Pablo Zhao, Geng Theoretical Economics The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm is stable and strategy-proof, but can produce outcomes that are Pareto-inefficient for students, and thus several alternative mechanisms have been proposed to correct this inefficiency. However, we show that these mechanisms cannot correct DA's rank-inefficiency and inequality, because these shortcomings can arise even in cases where DA is Pareto-efficient. We also examine students' segregation in settings with advantaged and marginalized students. We prove that the demographic composition of every school is perfectly preserved under any Pareto-efficient mechanism that dominates DA, and consequently fully segregated schools under DA maintain their extreme homogeneity. |
| title | What Pareto-Efficiency Adjustments Cannot Fix |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.11660 |